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INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of finance for growth has already been confirmed in numerous studies. 
This relationship is especially crucial for the transition economies where financial 
systems had to be built from the scratch after the collapse of central planning. This work 
investigates stock markets that constitute an important part of the developed financial 
system. Functioning stock markets are found to be necessary even if the country‟s 
financial system is bank-based. In fact, in the transition countries stock markets are a 
relatively new phenomenon. Even though in comparison to the developed countries these 
markets remain still underdeveloped, they have been evolving as an important 
complement to the banks in the course of the transition process (EBRD Transition Report 
2006). Stock markets emerged to help with the transformation of the state-owned assets 
to private hands and afterwards also with the rearrangement of ownership structures. 
They were also expected to assist companies in raising capital; however, the low number 
of initial public offerings in transition countries confirms that they have not succeeded in 
doing so. In addition to these functions connected to the transition process, stock markets 
in emerging countries are necessary in terms of performing the standard roles of financial 
market that include providing information about possible investment and improvement of 
resource allocation, monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance, risk 
diversification and mobilization of savings (Levine, 2005). 
Even before the stock markets were established, privatization process was 
initiated in transition countries. Its main goal was ownership transformation that would 
create suitable conditions for restructuring and development of the economy. As it is 
discussed at the beginning of the first chapter, privatization methods differed by 
countries. Some of them did not have any connection to the stock market, some only 
indirect one. Mass privatization, however, was pushed forward by stressing that in 
addition to equal distribution of wealth, it would also contribute to establishing a 
functioning stock market. Since mass privatization was in different forms implemented in 
the majority of transition countries, it stands out as an important factor influencing stock 
market emergence and development. The literature that investigates determinants of stock 
market development in general considers various institutional and macroeconomic 
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factors, the role of privatization in this process has however not been sufficiently 
discussed so far.  
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the relationship between mass 
privatization and stock market development in transition economies. The link is 
investigated empirically using a panel of data that includes transition countries for which 
corresponding data is available. The results confirm the hypothesis that mass privatization 
exerted a negative influence on stock market functioning in the short and medium term. 
Further, it appears that stock markets in countries with mass privatization were initially 
perceived as mere byproducts of the privatization process. Such stock markets typically 
not only failed in their core mission of providing capital for the corporate sector, but 
generated negative investor sentiment and did little to catalyze economic growth. 
The second chapter studies stock market emergence and development in the 
Czech Republic, one of the first countries where mass privatization was implemented. 
This economy later also served as a model for other transition countries. Czech 
privatization can be regarded as an experiment which allows us to conclude under what 
circumstances a viable market for shares could arise. Unlike the first chapter, where 
aggregate country data is used, in this study we employ micro level data on firms that 
participated in the mass privatization. We estimate the determinants of shares delisting 
e.g. exclusion from public trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) during the period 
1993 – 2004. Unlike its counterparts in Poland or Hungary, exceptionally large amounts 
of shares were delisted from the PSE. Using the data on listed and delisted companies it 
is showed that it was possible to prevent massive delisting if certain pre-privatization and 
privatization characteristics of the companies had been taken into account when deciding 
which companies to place on the stock exchange for public trading following the mass 
privatization.  
The third chapter deals with the analysis of delisting in the Slovak Republic, 
where in comparison to the Czech Republic, delisting took place five years later. We 
utilize a special relationship between the Czech and Slovak economy to investigate the 
role of delisting in the process of stock market emergence. A close connection between 
the Czech and Slovak market and a very similar unfavorable development on both 
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markets in the second half of 1990s, despite different institutional changes, emphasize the 
importance of mass privatization implemented in these countries. Benefiting from the 
results of our investigation in chapter two, we compare the development in Czech and 
Slovak economies and analyze the role of delisting in the process of market emergence 
and also reasons for delisting in both countries. Different delisting strategies and 
subsequent development on these markets suggest that decisions of the stock exchange 
authorities are crucial for further functioning of the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BUILDING A CASTLE ON SAND: THE EFFECTS OF MASS 
PRIVATIZATION ON STOCK MARKET CREATION IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
1
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Privatization, which enabled the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private hands, has 
been considered one of the keystones of the transition process in all post-communist 
economies and it became one of the first objectives of the newly formed governments. 
The emphasis was put on fast transfer of ownership via privatization and market was 
believed to ensure better and more efficient performance of the economy (Roland, 2001). 
In fact, efficiency was the most important argument for privatization as the transfer of 
ownership rights is crucial for the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. This 
way, the argument went, economic growth should be initiated. However, to achieve these 
objectives privatization itself is not sufficient since the functioning of a market economy 
requires not only private ownership but also a certain institutional framework to support 
the whole system. Roland (2001) in this respect stresses that the “policies of 
liberalization, stabilization and privatization that are not grounded in adequate institutions 
may not deliver successful outcomes” (p.30). More specifically, Zinnes et al. (2001) 
argue that “privatization involving change-of-title alone is not enough to generate 
economic performance improvements” (p.147). Therefore, what they call “deep” 
privatization, including institutional and “agency”-related reforms, is necessary.       
Unfortunately, taking into account the experience of the majority of transition 
countries, privatization can hardly be considered “deep”. The first reason is the fact that 
the state tends to use certain instruments (e.g. golden shares) to maintain control over 
some enterprises. Thus there exists a contradiction in the way the state behaves, insofar as 
                                                          
1
 For valuable comments I am indebted to Randall Filer, Jan Hanousek, Jan Kmenta, Evžen Kočenda, Filip 
Palda and Jan Švejnar. The paper benefited from various presentations at CERGE-EI as well as VIIIth 
International Conference Countries in Transition in Sofia (2005). 
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it initiates and supports the privatization process while at the same time exercising certain 
power over some companies2. This kind of discrepancy significantly slows down the 
transition process and may result in incomplete privatization. Secondly, the necessity for 
an institutional and legal framework was in many countries recognized only after the 
privatization process itself had begun, which led to the creation of some institutions 
within a very short period of time3. Given these problems, privatization as actually 
conducted cannot be considered “deep” privatization in the sense defined above. An 
important implication is the understanding that deep privatization not only enables private 
ownership but at the same time influences the development of institutions (incurring 
“hidden” costs) and through this channel the functioning of the whole economy.  
Privatization also profoundly affects the financial sector. Financial systems, which 
have no real function in the planned economy, must be developed from scratch during the 
transition process. As Bonin and Wachtel (2002) note, financial sectors in all transition 
countries continue to be relatively underdeveloped compared to the overall level of 
development of their economies. The capital needed for restructuring of transition 
economies (World Bank, 1996) has been far greater than initially weak, undercapitalized 
domestic banks could provide. The possibilities of firms to finance their investment 
activities was further limited by the inability of most to generate sufficient profits to 
finance the restructuring through retained earnings, a situation that suggests a great deal 
of reliance on equity financing. Thus, functioning stock markets became a necessity for 
firms in transition economies seeking capital. Development and regulation of these 
markets belong among the key issues that indicate the progress of reforms
4
. 
Besides their traditional role in raising capital, stock markets in transition 
economies have assisted in the transformation of state ownership and the rearrangement 
of ownership structures. Despite the importance of stock markets in these economies, the 
                                                          
2
 See Kočenda (1999); Kočenda and Valachy (2002) for calculations and more details. 
3
This problem was also pointed out by the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2004) when 
evaluating Economies in Transition. The OED claims that one of the two reasons why “the initial emphasis 
on rapid privatization to promote private sector development did not always achieve its intended effect was 
the lack of a supporting legal and institutional framework” (p.1). 
4
 Development and regulation of stock markets are now tracked as key indicators of progress in reform. The 
EBRD has constructed indicators reflecting progress of the financial system reform in transition countries. 
For more details see EBRD Transition Reports 1995–2003. 
1.1 Introduction 
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connection between privatization and stock market development has received little 
attention. In a study on the impact of the privatization process on the development of 
local stock markets, Perotti and Oijen (2001) argue that the resolution of political risk 
through sustained privatization is an important source of growth in the emerging stock 
markets. They show this on a sample of emerging markets where privatization using 
stock markets took place in the 1980s.  Stock markets in these countries were working 
before the actual privatization and the privatization method was dependent on the 
functioning stock market. This connection between privatization and stock markets, 
unfortunately, cannot be directly applied to the transition economies where privatization 
methods varied widely across countries and stock markets were not in place before 
privatization measures were introduced. The focus of this strand of research in transition 
countries has so far been on the positive effect of privatization on growth
5
, while the 
relation between privatization methods and newly established stock markets has received 
little discussion. 
Due to the large variety of privatization methods implemented (Brada, 1996), their 
relation to emerging stock markets also varies considerably. It is thus essential to consider 
advantages and disadvantages of different methods ex ante, i.e. from the perspective of 
decision-makers at the beginning of transition. 
While privatizing state assets through the stock market contributes positively to its 
functioning, direct sales of state assets in fact do not affect stock markets, at least not at 
the time of sale6. On the other hand, by the administrative decision of putting shares of all 
privatized companies on the market, mass privatization programs tended to ignore the 
standard listing requirements and suppressed the traditional concept of stock market 
development. It was incorrectly assumed that more publicly traded companies would 
generate a more liquid market. Such an artificial approach led to problems with stock 
market development, and the affected markets fell behind those, which had evolved 
gradually, in a more standard way. Hence, the functioning of stock markets in mass 
privatization countries would seem to lag the development of other transition economies, 
                                                          
5
 For more details see e.g. Bennett et al. (2004). 
6
 Later on, when the privatized companies grow, they can use stock market as one of the sources of capital 
(through IPOs) and this way fuel their operations. 
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which we consider to be the price for establishing stock markets only as a kind of “by-
product” of mass privatization.  
The primary objective of this research, therefore, is to empirically investigate the 
connection between the privatization method implemented and the consequent capital 
market development. Considering the entire transition process with an emphasis on the 
country‟s institutional setting and legal framework reveal the costs implied by mass 
privatization with respect to stock market creation. Our aim is both to describe the 
situation in transition countries and by utilizing the available data determine the influence 
of privatization method on the emerging stock market.  
Our results provide empirical evidence confirming that mass privatization 
influenced stock market development and exerted a negative impact on stock market 
functioning in transition countries. We confirm this relationship using different indicators 
of stock market development in the short and medium run. 
The following section provides motivation for our work. Section 1.3 discusses the 
privatization process in transition countries, section 1.4 provides an overview of stock 
market development in these countries and section 1.5 examines mass privatization in 
connection to stock market emergence and development. In sections 1.6 and 1.7 we 
discuss the data used, specifications of estimated equations, results and their 
interpretation. Section 1.8 concludes.  
 
1.2 Importance of a functioning stock market 
Investigation of the relationship between privatization method and stock market 
emergence is important not only in the context of the economics of transition but also for 
the long-term development prospects of these countries
7
. Stock markets in general 
provide an important source of financing viable investment projects and thus indirectly 
initiate further economic growth. Empirical studies of King and Levine (1993), Levine 
and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine (2004) provide 
evidence of a positive correlation between stock market development and economic 
                                                          
7
 The importance of economic growth for transition economies and the problems connected to it are 
discussed in e.g. Campos and Coricelli (2002). 
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growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) use data on 47 countries (1976 – 1993) to show that 
stock market liquidity and banking development are positively correlated with 
contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity growth. Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), by employing panel techniques, find 
that deep and liquid equity markets have had a significant and persistent impact on 
economic performance. They indicate that stock markets promote economic development 
by providing investors with a potential exit mechanism, offering liquidity to investors that 
encourages diversification, supplying firms with access to permanent capital and 
generating information about the quality of potential investments. Beck and Levine 
(2004) apply generalized-method-of-moments techniques developed for dynamic panels. 
They show that stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth and that 
these findings are not due to potential biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables 
or unobserved country-specific effects. Positive influence of stock markets on growth 
holds true even for bank-driven financial systems prevailing in transition countries. As 
Korhonen et al. (2000) argue, stock markets in both market-based as well as bank-driven 
systems provide economic agents with valuable information about prices in the economy 
and offer a means of reallocating risks. Therefore, their importance within the financial 
system should not be neglected by policy makers in transition countries. 
In the context of stock market development another important stream of empirical 
literature examines the institutional framework, including the legal system, as a major 
determinant of financial development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998). These studies emphasize the importance of the rights of minority 
shareholders as well as creditors. Better legal systems in this respect ensure a safer 
environment for investors, meaning that the financial sector can develop much faster. 
However, good legal systems are necessary but not sufficient, because as Pistor et al. 
(2000) stress, a persistent obstacle towards greater financial development is the lack of 
enforcement of existing laws.  
An important role that well-developed securities markets play concerns the 
possibility to prevent crisis in the banking system if a credit crunch occurs. In such a case 
securities markets can help fill the ensuing funding gap and thus the “existence of 
Chapter 1 
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multiple avenues of financial intermediation” can be important in preventing financial 
crises from causing sustained knock-on effects on the real economy (Wagner and Iakova, 
2001). In this respect Davis (2001) finds empirical evidence that the existence of active 
securities markets alongside banks is beneficial for the stability of corporate financing. 
However, in this case it is also necessary to take into account the other side of the coin, 
which is the possibility of securities markets contributing to financial crisis, especially if 
they become too liberalized and vulnerable to global shocks.  
All in all, a country‟s financial development is closely related to its institutional 
and legal framework and, it is also one of the factors fostering economic growth. This 
area of research points out crucial role policies play in supporting the development of 
financial intermediaries and markets. Nevertheless, we need to be careful in applying 
these considerations to transition countries, since all of the above-indicated standard and 
well established relationships may not hold as strongly and straightforwardly as in the 
developed economies. This view is supported by Berglof and Bolton (2003), who 
examine the experience of financial transition based on the ratio of domestic credit to 
GDP being a measure of financial development. They argue that the link between 
financial development and economic growth does not appear to be very strong during the 
first decade of transition. Nevertheless, the findings of Bennett et al. (2004) which 
investigates the impact of differences in privatization and in private sector and stock 
market development on economic growth in transition economies during the time period 
from 1991 to 2001 confirm a significant positive impact of stock market development on 
growth.  
Although in the context of transition the aforementioned relationships are at 
present not all that persuasive, the real functioning of stock markets is of vital importance 
for all transition economies. In the course of the transition process these markets facilitate 
allocation of property rights either after the initial distribution of vouchers in a mass 
privatization or in the case of the sale of state assets through direct share offerings (World 
Bank, 1996). Furthermore, despite strong internationalization pressures and the 
possibility of listing securities abroad, these markets are expected to serve as a source of 
capital for the expanding medium-sized companies (Bakker and Gross, 2004) that are 
1.2 Importance of a functioning stock market 
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crucial for economic growth. However, Bakker and Gross further emphasize that they do 
not expect small stock exchanges in transition countries to survive on their own but rather 
to enter into strategic partnerships with other exchanges
8
. On the other hand, larger 
companies have an advantage because of the possibility to enter markets abroad, in 
comparison to smaller enterprises that suffer from various constraints (Lizal and Švejnar, 
2001) and therefore have to rely on the functioning local stock markets. The need for 
efficient stock markets in transition economies is thus essential and should be considered 
one of the main policy priorities in these countries. 
 
1.3 Privatization process in transition economies  
A majority of studies concerning transition countries indicates that the overall impact of 
privatization on the functioning of these economies was positive (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Estin et al., 2009)
9
. Yet, even though various impact channels are examined in 
these studies, care needs to be taken when interpreting their results. As Stiglitz (1999) 
points out, means and ends are often mixed together here. The main objective of 
privatization is to attain efficiency in the economy and to initiate sustainable economic 
growth. Hence privatization serves as a mean to these ends. However, in a broader sense 
even the creation of a market economy can be a means to sustainable development. If this 
kind of interpretation is considered, Stiglitz argues that the success of market-oriented 
reform is more mixed. On the other hand, private property is undoubtedly one of the key 
inputs in the standard model of a market economy and thus privatization, despite certain 
doubts and controversies concerning the whole process, is necessary.  
The privatization process itself depends on several crucial factors that are of 
importance for this study as well. In general, the chosen privatization method plays a key 
role (World Bank, 1996). Even the sequencing of the whole process becomes very 
important (Gupta, Ham and Švejnar, 2000). In the context of transition countries, at every 
phase of the privatization process, crucial decisions were taken by the state authorities; 
                                                          
8
 This process has already started e.g. Vienna Stock Exchange acquired shares in Budapest as well as 
Prague Stock Exchanges. All the stock exchanges in Baltic countries are part of the OMX group. 
9
 The results showing mostly positive impact of privatization on transition economies have been challenged 
by Hanousek, Kočenda, and Švejnar (2007). 
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privatization is therefore considered to be exogenous
10
. The decisions of these authorities 
differed and thus, as Table A1.1 in the appendix indicates, the privatization process has 
exhibited a large degree of variability as each transition economy has pursued its 
individual strategy (World Bank, 2002). The table also illustrates the importance of the 
voucher method as primary as well as secondary method of privatization. Nevertheless, 
differences among countries do not concern only the methods implemented. Variability is 
caused by the different initial conditions, political backgrounds, and other country 
specific factors, as well as the speed, sequencing, and timing of the privatization in the 
context of the whole transition process. 
                                                          
10
 Exogenous here means the decision about privatization and its timing with respect to the stock market. 
Clearly, the privatization decision is not a function of the stock market. 
The World Bank report assessing the first ten years of transition (2002), stresses 
that the ideal privatization strategy leading to the best after-privatization performance of 
companies would have been to transfer assets as rapidly as possible to individual 
investors or concentrated groups of strategic investors through open, fair and transparent 
methods. Unfortunately, such a procedure was not possible to implement in many 
countries given certain country specific characteristics, especially those of a political 
nature (Biais and Perotti, 2002). In this respect, the argument of equal distribution was 
very strong especially in the countries where voucher privatization played a significant 
role. Besides these characteristics, the gains in economic efficiency or necessary 
government revenues from privatization were crucial (Gupta, Ham and Švejnar, 2000). 
Accordingly, the designers of privatization mainly considered the speed of the ownership 
transfer together with economic and political issues important at that time, but did not 
accurately estimate or even take into account the possible future consequences of 
employing a certain privatization method.  
In general, privatization was one of the first reform steps undertaken in the 
transition process and different privatization methods tended to affect the development of 
emerging stock markets in different ways.  
 SMALL SCALE PRIVATIZATION concerned small and medium enterprises 
privatized by implementing particularly simple auctions at the beginning of the transition  
1.3 Privatization process in transition economies 
 12 
process. In this respect, small-scale privatization is considered to be one of what the 
EBRD transition report (2003) considers initial phase reforms, which are more 
straightforward and relatively easier to implement
11
. And true enough, this level of 
privatization has been for the most part successful, and the majority of transition 
countries have managed to conclude it relatively quickly. Yet from our point of view it is 
important to note that the small-scale privatization neither initiated nor had an effect on 
the stock market development, since most of these firms were and stayed not large 
enough to become publicly traded.  
 THE SALE OF STATE PROPERTY (case-by-case privatization) concerns primarily 
large and strategic enterprises, and has not yet been completed. Case-by-case privatization 
can take the form of direct sales or share issue privatization, similar to initial public 
offerings in the private sector (Brada, 1996). State property is sold directly to the new 
owner, who can be domestic as well as foreign. According to EBRD (2003), this 
privatization method belongs to the category of so-called second phase reforms, which 
are more complex and take longer to implement as they require the development of 
market-based structures and institutions, including a stock market. In this respect, case-
by-case privatization influenced stock market greatly. However, in this case stock markets 
tend to emerge gradually and originate through voluntary IPOs, which themselves are 
either initiated by share issue privatization or by firms already acquired by new owners 
who are searching for additional capital resources, since the supply of capital for 
restructuring from other sources is limited
12
. Conditions in the economy thus require the 
existence of a stock market, and allow it to develop in a standard way.  
 MASS PRIVATIZATION was considered an appropriate privatization method 
especially with respect to the conditions that prevailed in transition countries at the 
beginning of the transition process
13
. Further, its social and political acceptability 
                                                          
11
 The World Bank (1996) also stresses that small assets are easier to privatize than larger enterprises and 
that positive outcome in the former category are relatively assured. 
12
 In this respect the role of banks in the economy is important. Whereas in the Czech Republic companies 
were able to obtain loans from a bank relatively easily (soft budget constraint), in Hungary it was quite 
difficult to obtain resources from a bank and therefore the stock market development was initiated from the 
inside. 
13
 This basically concerns undercapitalization and the lack of foreign investors‟ interest to invest in these 
economies. This issue has already been discussed in the introduction. 
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followed from the equal distribution of shares as well as from the fact that citizens 
incorrectly perceived income from privatization to be net profit for them. The Barro-
Ricardian equivalence was hence not valid, which gave the authorities a chance to “bribe” 
people and gain their support for mass privatization (Hanousek and Tůma, 2002). 
All in all mass privatization was, in different forms and modifications, included as 
a part of the privatization program in 21 out of 27 transition economies. Still, the 
proportion of formerly state owned assets privatized using this method differed 
considerably among them. Table A1.2 in the appendix illustrates the different variations 
of mass privatization that were implemented
14
. The first countries to implement mass 
privatization already at the beginning of the 1990s were Russia and the former 
Czechoslovakia. They later served as a model for other countries (e.g. Bulgaria‟s first 
wave of mass privatization followed the Czech model: for more details see Table A1.3 in 
the appendix). The relatively high number of mass privatization models that are presented 
in the table also suggests that the diversity of ways in which privatization was 
implemented has also had a further impact on the outcomes of the whole transition 
process. Nevertheless, the way voucher privatization was conducted led to only a formal 
change of ownership from the state to a large number of uninformed shareholders who 
had no experience managing these kinds of assets. In essence, this means that the 
ineffectiveness connected to the state as an owner was in fact just transferred to a group 
of new owners who could be considered “quasi-owners,” and who did not think 
strategically and whose planning horizon was relatively short. As the World Bank (1996) 
report points out, these owners were survival-oriented, focused only on sustaining current 
cash flow. Since the immediate liquidation value of such companies was often higher 
than the net present value of future investments (Lízal and Švejnar, 2001) it was more 
profitable for these “quasi-owners” to “tunnel” the company and use its assets to make 
themselves better off.  
Given the way it was conducted, then, mass privatization cannot be considered 
“deep” privatization in the sense defined above. It brought about serious problems that 
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 Some countries provided equal access to all citizens while in others there were significant concessions 
provided to insiders: Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia (for more details see EBRD Transition Report 
1997). This fact has also influenced trading with shares after the privatization. 
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were either dismissed as only temporary (and were believed capable of being solved by 
the power of the market
15
) or that were not accounted for when privatization was 
undertaken. Mass privatization failed to generate the new capital necessary to restructure 
companies strategically, or to concentrate ownership. Its implementation is thus still 
subject to debate. Nevertheless, it is important to note that mass privatization would not 
necessarily have been unwise or inappropriate, if its natural continuation had been 
recognized and implemented. The World Bank report assessing the first ten years of 
transition (2002), for instance, points out that mass voucher privatization in the former 
Czechoslovakia would have had a better chance of producing more restructuring and less 
corruption if the legal framework governing companies, investment funds, and capital 
market activities had been enforced from the very beginning. The fact that other transition 
countries where mass privatization was a dominant privatization method suffered from 
similar weaknesses in the way this procedure was implemented would indicate that the 
success of mass privatization required a transparent and appropriately regulated stock 
market with minority shareholders‟ protection and active corporate governance 
(Hanousek and Kočenda, 2003). If these conditions had been set up properly in the 
immediate aftermath of mass privatization, the results of the overall privatization process 
would have been far more satisfactory. The failure to set up these conditions and even 
more to the point the failure to recognize the impact of privatization on the stock market, 
naturally precluded a more satisfactory outcome to the privatization process.  
 
1.4 Stock markets in transition economies  
Before investigating the role of privatization in stock market development, we first briefly 
examine the phenomenon of stock market emergence in transition economies. This issue 
is of particular importance because stock markets are, even today, not yet properly 
functioning and in comparison to their western counterparts relatively unimportant for the 
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domestic economies in the great majority of countries
16
. Therefore, it is useful for policy 
makers to know which forces make stock market operate.  
1.4.1 Factors determining the emergence of stock markets 
Whether a stock market in a certain country exists is determined by a large variety of 
factors, many of them having a connection to economic growth; in the context of 
transition economies privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and the regulatory 
environment are of particular importance (EBRD 1998). 
Initial conditions prevailing at the beginning of the transition process concern a lot 
of aspects and therefore it is difficult to measure them succinctly. They affect the 
economic performance in transition countries (De Melo et al., 1997; Berg et al., 1999; 
Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Falcetti et al., 2001) and can to certain extent influence stock 
market emergence as well. The process of stock market creation is relatively easier for 
countries that already have a certain tradition and experience with its functioning: that is, 
it had existed in that country before communism
17
.  
Nevertheless, as has already been discussed earlier, the privatization process plays 
a role in this process. Based on the EBRD Transition Report 1995 the development of the 
securities markets in transition countries “has so far been largely shaped by the nature of 
privatization programs” (p.164).  Not only do certain privatization methods require the 
immediate existence of a stock market but they also determine the post-privatization 
ownership structure. Based on this structure further trading evolves, and in this way 
privatization method becomes a mechanism that predetermines the functioning of an 
emerging stock market (Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 1999). 
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 For more details see Wagner and Iakova (2001), Bonin and Wachtel (2002), Köke and Schröder (2002), 
EBRD Transition Report 2003 as well as law-oriented literature e.g. Ahdieh (2003). 
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 EBRD Transition Report 1995 also notes that the formation of securities markets began in 1990-91with 
the reestablishment of exchanges in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Then in 1993 the 
Prague Stock Exchange was reopened.  
Related studies concerning stock market development (King and Levine, 1993; La 
Porta et al., 1997; Henry, 2000; Yartey, 2008) provide evidence that the most crucial 
factors influencing stock markets include the macroeconomic environment and 
institutional arrangements in the economy. With increasing income per capita individuals 
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tend to have more resources available to invest on the stock market and this contributes to 
its development. As Garcia and Giorgio (2003) note, there is a tendency for the share of 
equity markets to increase relative to banking markets as per capita income increases. 
Another related variable is the level of public debt in the economy, since the higher level 
of debt can to a certain extent cause crowding out of the private sector from the stock 
market. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that inflation negatively influences stock 
market.  
The role of institutions and appropriate legal environment in the transition process 
has already been pointed out as well. According to Ahdieh (2003), law scholars have 
identified, at most, an indirect role for law in the market transition process. This role 
basically concerns creating a framework within which securities markets will 
spontaneously emerge. It includes clear property rights, provision of reliable contract 
enforcement and more recently the protection of minority investors. Pistor (2000) argues 
that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for healthy stock market 
development because what seems to matter most in transition economies is the actual 
enforcement of law.  
The development of stock markets may be slowed down if there are other strong 
financial intermediaries in the economy, namely banks providing enterprises with 
sufficient credit. Yet empirical evidence (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zevros; 
1995) shows that the effect of banks and the effect of the stock market do not eliminate 
each other, and that both do contribute to economic growth. Thus, if both of these 
financial intermediaries function well, raising capital for investments is more efficient 
and this naturally stimulates economic growth. Nevertheless, banks may continue to be 
favoured due to tradition and also because stock markets generally require more 
sophisticated investors making decisions about their portfolios. In spite of their preferred 
position, however, banks depend on progress made in the financial system and in banking 
reform, both of which are inseparable parts of the transition process. And as Table A1.4 
in the appendix indicates, financial system reform has not progressed far enough in all the 
transition economies.  
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The influence of these factors on developing stock markets has already been 
discussed in the relevant literature. The exception seems to be the privatization method 
and its implementation which, we conjecture, has played a key role in stock market 
formation. This conjecture has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature so far.  
1.4.2 Development at the emerging stock markets 
Given the above-suggested connection between privatization and stock markets, the 
success of transition reforms
18
 is questionable also with respect to the functioning of 
stock markets. This is partly the result of insufficient reforms and partly due to the fact 
that even though certain laws and regulations have been enacted, it takes time to 
implement and enforce them and to observe any positive results connected to the changes 
in legislation. Therefore, as EBRD Transition Report 2003 reports, even though 
improvements in the legal and regulatory framework for pension funds, growing 
transparency, and efficiency and sophistication of the securities market have been 
observed (especially in Russia, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovakia), the financial sector 
in the transition economies is still considered underdeveloped. Despite financial sector‟s 
overall growth, nonbank sector has been growing only in recent years (EBRD Transition 
Report 2006).  
As to the development of the financial sector, stock markets have followed 
different patterns in transition countries. In comparison to other structures of the market 
economy, their creation is more complicated because there is a need to support the 
institutional infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms as well (Bonin and Wachtel, 
2002). However, this need was not sufficiently taken into account in some countries
19
.  
Stock market development mainly started from scratch despite the fact that some 
of these markets were actually reestablished after several decades. Depending on the 
country stock markets emerged at different stages of the transition process. Some of them 
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 It should be noted that the privatization of some strategic enterprises as well as other aspects of the 
transition process have yet to be completed. EBRD Transition report (2003) notes that even in the most 
advanced countries of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEB) that became members of the EU, 
reforms have to continue. This mainly concerns the breadth and depth of these countries‟ financial markets 
and the restructuring of strategic sectors such as energy, heavy industry and agriculture. 
19
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officially started in the early 1990s. This first group includes countries where mass 
privatization was not implemented as a primary method: Slovenia (1990), Hungary 
(1990) and Poland (1991). Then, in 1993 stock exchanges in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Lithuania followed, all of them connected to the mass privatization 
program. Other stock exchanges were established later on in the mid-1990s (Romania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Russia) but there are still several transition countries where stock markets 
in fact do not exist
20
. Yet another distinct feature in transition stock market development 
is the impetus for their creation. While in some countries their formation was an 
inseparable part of the transformation strategy and was, together with the framework for 
security trading, planned well in advance (this concerns the first group of countries 
mentioned above), there are other instances where this was not the case and stock markets 
emerged only because they were necessary to supplement other reforms, most often mass 
privatization. This has consequences for the way these markets developed. The “planned” 
ones, despite their volatility, grew gradually with a clear upward sloping trend. The others 
experienced a kind of overheating during the first years of their existence, then 
encountered significant problems and in fact had to start over again at the end of the 
1990s (see Figure A1.1 in the appendix). 
The emerging stock markets of transition countries hence still do not perform their 
primary economic function and are rarely used as a source of finance for the corporate 
sector (Wagner and Iakova, 2001). These markets are in general characterized by low 
liquidity because only a few securities of the most important companies are usually traded 
frequently enough on each market (Wagner and Iakova, 2001; Bonin and Wachtel, 2002; 
Bakker and Gross, 2004). Such a situation naturally results in more expensive financing 
possibilities for companies and thus this source of finance is seldom used.  
Yet another indicator describing stock market functioning is market capitalization 
relative to GDP, which is despite its high levels following mass privatization relatively 
low
21
 in transition economies. As Table A1.5 in the appendix illustrates, even though the 
two best performing countries (Estonia: 27.5%, Czech Republic: 20.8%) reach the values  
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 Here we refer to de facto existence, not de jure. This concerns Albania, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan. 
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 Table A1.7 in the appendix shows that based on our data set its average stands at 9 %. 
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characteristic for other emerging markets (e.g. Argentina: 27.7%, Brazil: 25.65%, 
Mexico: 27.12%), they are still significantly falling behind the market capitalization to 
GDP figures for the developed markets (e.g. United Kingdom: 131.69%, United States: 
105.9%, or EMU markets: 44.56%).
22
 Moreover, as the ECB report concerning financial 
sectors of EU accession countries (2002) observes, given the relatively low levels of GDP 
per capita, market capitalization in absolute terms is particularly low.  
The indicators of stock market liquidity give nearly the same picture. When 
considering the value of stocks traded (as % of GDP), the best performing transition 
economies (Hungary: 10.7% and Estonia: 10%) are comparable with other emerging 
markets (Brazil: 11.59% and Mexico: 9.16%), however they are far behind the developed 
economies (United States: 124.1%, United Kingdom: 70.42%). Turnover ratio indicator 
values are somewhat better, especially for the best performing transition economies as 
they are already close to some of the developed markets (EMU: 103.16%, United 
Kingdom: 64.16%).  
Further general characteristics of transition stock markets include insufficient 
regulation, institutional fragility or weak minority shareholder protection. All of these 
problems are connected to the legal and institutional framework, which in most cases did 
not exist when stock markets were established (EBRD 1998; Bonin and Wachtel, 2002) 
and which is still not sufficiently developed nor functioning well. The problem in this 
respect is twofold: not only is a certain time needed to make such a framework 
operational but the simple copying of institutions that are functioning successfully in 
developed economies is not sufficient to guarantee success. Hanousek and Filer (1997) in 
this respect stress that lack of experience combined with legal and regulatory uncertainty 
can result in institutions failing to perform their roles efficiently. On the other hand, 
especially in those countries accessing the EU, the necessary legislation has already been 
enacted and thus the legal environment is expected to improve. However, the 
enforcement of these new rules also requires a certain period of time, and the positive 
impact of this legislation is still not clearly visible.  
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Even though stock market development in the transition countries has not been 
too favorable so far, and even though markets tend to be inefficient, illiquid and 
unreliable, there are still possibilities to improve the situation, especially thanks to the 
pension system reforms that have been gradually implemented or are under consideration 
in most of the transition economies. Institutional investors are expected to play a 
significant role in the new pension systems and thus contribute to greater liquidity and 
turnover on the stock exchanges (Wagner and Iakova, 2001).  Moreover, pension reform 
is also supposed to spur the demand for domestic securities: but in this respect the lack of 
securities in which investors would be willing to invest creates a significant obstacle 
(most of the emerging markets have only a few such securities). Yet another means of 
boosting the performance of transition capital markets is the option that most 
governments in these countries still possess – to privatize residual state ownership in 
strategic companies through the stock market and to attract potential investors in this 
way. 
Despite all of the above-mentioned problems, trading has become more lively, 
especially in those countries that have accessed EU and thus are more attractive for 
foreign investors. Additionally, a trend towards integration among stock exchanges
23
 
contributes to the simplification of trading and at the same time offers a larger portfolio 
of products for potential investors. 
 
1.5 Mass privatization and stock market development 
Privatization methods in transition countries were rarely driven by the objective of 
developing a modern stock market (EBRD Transition Report, 1997). Yet despite this fact, 
stock market development per se in transition countries indicates a possible connection 
between the privatization method employed and the consequent stock market functioning, 
something which has not been considered in the recent literature dealing with the 
emergence and development of stock markets in transition economies. One important 
study that at least recognizes the importance of institutions and law is that by Claessens et 
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al. (2000)
24
. Examining 20 transition economies, they distinguish three sources of stock 
market origins: mandatory listing following mass privatization, voluntary initial public 
offerings (IPOs), and mandatory listing of minority packages (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Sources of stock market origins 
Mandatory listing 
after mass 
privatization 
Voluntary 
initial 
public 
offerings 
Mandatory listing of 
minority 
packages during 
privatization 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
FYR Macedonia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Romania 
Slovakia 
 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Poland 
Slovenia 
 
 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Poland 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Source: Claessens S., Djankov S., Klingebiel D. (2000): “Stock Markets in  
Transition Economies,” Financial Sector Discussion Paper No.5,  
The World Bank. 
 
The authors further assess the development of stock markets using different indicators 
and conclude that these markets are underdeveloped in comparison to those in industrial 
countries, and that the basic financial sector infrastructure is often missing. An empirical 
analysis based on a regression model highlights the importance of mild inflation, good 
shareholder protection, and institutional investor assets for the development of stock 
markets in transition economies. However, the influence of privatization is not taken into 
account.   
If one considers mandatory listing of minority packages a special case of 
mandatory listing, even the above-mentioned classification can fit the general pattern of 
two basic approaches through which capital markets can be created: so-called top-down 
(government-led) and bottom-up (market-led) (Simoneti, 1997). In the top-down 
approach the government takes the initiative (World Bank, 1996) and the necessary laws 
and regulations are prepared before the actual trading starts. Development begins at the 
high end of the market with only a small number of high quality stocks initially traded. 
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 It was followed by several papers (Pajuste, 2002; Bonin and Wachtel, 2002; Claessens et al., 2003; 
Berglof and Bolton, 2003) which strongly relied on its findings and extended them in different directions 
concerning financial system architecture, corporate governance, or European integration. 
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These securities are offered in traditional voluntary IPOs on the stock exchange, and 
trading with them tends to be fairly liquid. Later, when the market develops, the number 
of stocks traded also grows. This kind of stock market creation dominated in both 
countries where there was no mandatory listing of securities in the aftermath of 
privatization (e.g. Hungary) and where stock markets were created well before the actual 
mass privatization began (Poland). In fact, stock markets without mandatory listing 
typically develop because economic conditions require it, as the supply of capital for 
restructuring from other sources is limited
25
. Nonetheless, this approach also has its 
shortcomings in that there is a risk of overregulation; in this way the market‟s true needs 
might not be accounted for, as is the case in Albania (World Bank, 1996) where the stock 
market de facto has not worked so far.  
On the other hand, under the bottom-up approach, supply and demand form the 
rules that govern the market since there are no, or only minimal, regulations set up before 
trading on these market commences. More effective rules and institutions tend to develop 
this way (World Bank, 1996) but the disadvantage is the existence of the unregulated 
market before the actual rules are set. This situation is typical for economies where stocks 
were mandatory listed following mass privatization, which was implemented in various 
modifications (see Tables A1.2 and A1.3 in the appendix). The natural outcome of such a 
privatization is a large number of stocks that are listed on the stock exchange governed by 
minimal regulations. Such markets were required to facilitate quick ownership 
transformation and thus the development of a stock market is nearly spontaneous, being 
only a response to the trading needs generated by privatization (Fine and Karlova, 1998). 
Taking this statement to extremes, it is possible to consider stock markets a kind of by-
product of mass privatization.  
Simoneti (1997) distinguishes two bottom-up scenarios. Under the first one, 
stocks of all companies are traded on the public market. In order to enable this, minimal 
regulatory standards are set (Czech Republic, Slovakia). Gradually, as regulation  
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 In this respect the role of banks in the economy is important. Whereas in the Czech Republic companies 
were able to obtain loan from a bank relatively easily (soft budget constraint), in Hungary it was quite 
difficult to obtain capital from a bank and therefore the stock market development was pushed from the 
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strengthens, some companies can no longer manage to meet these requirements and have 
to leave the public market. The second scenario materializes when a certain limited 
number of securities is traded publicly and are subject to strict regulation, while the rest 
remain “quasi-public” and are subject to relatively weak regulation (e.g. Slovenia). This 
so-called dual approach enables the stock market to develop simultaneously at the high 
and low end of the market. 
The two main approaches to stock market creation relate to the privatization 
method implemented in certain countries (Table A1.1 in the appendix). However, as there 
are different modifications of privatization methods, stock market creation can also be 
difficult to classify into one of the above-mentioned categories.  In more general terms, 
Fine and Karlova (1998) ascribe the distinct path of stock market development in 
transition countries to the following factors: the design of the privatization program in 
individual countries, the degree of stock market development at the beginning of the 
program, and different approaches to stock market regulation. Moreover, the availability 
of other sources of capital in addition to the stock market also plays an important role.  
All in all, the role of finance in fostering economic growth is especially important 
in transition countries. The emerging stock markets and their development differ a lot in 
these economies. Our previous discussion suggests that the important role the 
privatization has played in the process of stock market formation has not been researched 
sufficiently so far. This is the phenomenon that we further examine empirically. 
 
1.6 Methodology and data 
To investigate the influence of mass privatization on the emerging stock markets we 
consider the starting hypothesis that mass privatization in the transition countries did not 
affect the development of their stock markets. The alternative claims that mass 
privatization has influenced stock market development. Based on the above discussion we 
expect that it has exhibited a negative influence on their functioning, especially in the 
short and medium run. The formal model specification accounts for the effect of 
privatization together with the country effect in the following way:  
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where the relevant groups of variables are defined as follows:  
 market_ind stands for an indicator of stock market development (market 
capitalization, turnover ratio, value traded, new capital raised) in country i at time t; 
 country stands for country effect concerning country i; 
 priv is a dummy variable that equals 1 starting from the year mass privatization was 
implemented in country i and 0 otherwise; 
 tr stands for linear trend that is added to the privatization dummy variable. 
Since the privatization method of our primary concern is mass privatization, the estimated 
specification includes a dummy variable for mass privatization. As, based on our 
conjecture, this privatization method exhibits a special impact on the emerging stock 
market, we only distinguish between mass privatization on one hand and other 
privatization methods on the other.  Mass privatization dummy variable is considered 
exogenous and we include it with as well as without linear trend. The dummy variable 
without trend is meant to uncover the average effect of mass privatization on the stock 
market. The second dummy variable which accounts for linear trend is included because 
we anticipate the impact of privatization to evolve during the transition period due to the 
consolidation of ownership structure of privatized companies following the actual 
privatization. This process took several years and, in the majority of cases, was 
intermediated by the stock market. Consequently, most trades that took place on the stock 
exchanges depended heavily on the privatization method and its progress. By considering 
both dummy variables, we intend to investigate the interaction of the initial effect of 
privatization and its evolution over time as well.  
It has already been noted that the implementation of mass privatization usually 
took several years and thus its impact on stock markets could not be observed in the same 
year the privatization started. We take this into account by estimating the above-described 
specification first as contemporaneous effect and then with one and two years lags.  
All the estimations are done using country specific fixed effects. We estimate the 
effect of privatization on stock market development by considering the privatization and 
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country effects together (equation 1.1). We control only for privatization and country 
effects at this stage, as our primary objective is to uncover if the effect of privatization is 
present in the data, that is, if privatization has had any influence on stock market 
development in transition countries at all. Even though controlling for country effects 
may be considered too broad a variable, in fact it contains all the country specific 
characteristics we need to account for. Therefore this is a much more general indicator 
than using only certain selected economic variables
26
. By casting a wide net, we avoid the 
problem of possible model misspecification, since it is especially challenging to identify 
those economic variables that are truly crucial for stock market development in the case 
of transition countries.  
 
1.6.1 Data 
Our data comes primarily from the World Development Indicators Database, available 
from the World Bank. Where indicated, the data set is supplemented by data from the 
World Federation of Exchanges as well as by local stock exchange figures. Dummy 
variables for mass privatization are constructed based on different issues of the Transition 
Report published by EBRD. A definition and brief description of the most important 
variables used in this study are provided in appendix in Table A1.6 and Table A1.7. 
In order to investigate whether and to what extent the privatization methods in 
transition economies influenced the actual emergence and development of their stock 
markets, we look at a sample of the former communist countries. Altogether there are 27 
states in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia considered to be transition 
economies. Based on the availability of data, the majority of them is included in our 
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 These variables concern the overall economic development of the country, its stability, other available 
channels of financial intermediation, as well as the legal and institutional environment. However, due to the 
nature of our sample and the unavailability of a significant part of the necessary data for transition 
economies, the inclusion of these factors would lead to serious difficulties in econometric estimations. 
There would be an insufficient number of observations, plus an endogeneity problem could arise when 
using some economic variables as explanatory variables. Unfortunately, standard methods of dealing with 
this problem are very difficult to apply in the case of transition economies because it is practically 
impossible to find an appropriate instrument. And even if we were able to come up with some reasonable 
one, it is usually impossible to obtain reliable data for it. A two-stage estimation would require even more 
variables, leading us straight into the data availability problem again. 
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investigation. The list of countries and variables covered is provided in Table A1.5 in the 
appendix. 
Since our intention is to investigate the short and medium effect of privatization 
method on stock market development, the time period under consideration covers the 
transition period from 1990 to 2003. In the long run, there exist other important factors 
significantly influencing stock market (e.g. entering EU) and it would be become 
increasingly difficult to disentangle just the influence of the privatization method. 
Nevertheless, our data constitutes an unbalanced panel because stock markets were 
established at different points in time in different countries. Moreover, not all transition 
countries have proceeded far enough in the transition process to make it possible to 
investigate the aforementioned link there. Therefore this unbalanced panel is the result of 
“true” missing values as well as observations that are not available due to the non-
existence of a stock market
27
.  
Yet another problem causing an unbalanced panel is the quality of the available 
data. Even though data exists for certain countries, care must be taken to examine the data 
before using them and, if necessary, to “clean” them for further estimations. Such 
“cleaning” is needed because the nature of transition economies leads to observations that 
cannot be included in the data set. It is, however, not possible to stipulate exact rules on 
which we made our decisions, as they were primarily based on original country data. In 
our case, the estimation results may be easily spoiled by growth rates recorded in the 
thousands of percent for cases when a certain newly-created stock exchange traded during 
a time period shorter than one year, or when it took several years before even some 
trading was initiated
28
. Frequent organizational changes on the stock exchanges and other 
exogenous factors have in some instances also influenced the actual figures and thus need 
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 We do not assign a “zero” value for those countries where the stock market did not exist at the beginning 
of transition because such an approach would result in an artificially balanced panel. Even though this 
would not change the estimated coefficients, t-statistics could be affected significantly and through them the 
results of the whole hypothesis testing.  
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 This was the case, for example, in Croatia (1994, 1995 and only in 1996 did the stock exchange begin to 
pick up), Latvia (the stock exchange was founded in 1993, trading started in 1995, and only in 1996 did the 
situation stabilize to a certain extent), Lithuania (trading officially started in 1993 but the figures are very 
low until 1995; in 1996 it began to stabilize), Moldova (official beginning in 1995 but trading lively only in 
1997), and Romania (started operation in 1995 but reasonable trading only in 1997). 
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to be accounted for
29
. Another exogenous influence was the Russian crisis. All of these 
problems were taken into account when cleaning the data and constructing the actual data 
set, so observations that could potentially damage the analysis have either been omitted or 
have been remedied by creating suitable dummy variables. 
 
1.6.2 Measures of stock market development 
We measure stock market development using standard indicators of market size and 
liquidity which have been used in the studies investigating development of stock markets 
and its connection to economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004). Unlike these 
studies, this analysis deals with transition economies and therefore we find it important to 
add another measure of stock market development, new capital raised. 
 The most frequently used indicator of market size is the market capitalization. It 
reflects the total value of domestic shares listed on a certain stock exchange. Ideally, this 
measure shows the importance of financing through equity issues. To enable comparison 
among countries, market capitalization can be expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
However, larger markets do not have to perform better, as the size does not necessarily 
reflect their effectiveness. This is of particular interest especially in countries where the 
number of listed companies results from the implemented privatization method. Under 
mass privatization with mandatory stock listing, this indicator of market size can be 
significantly inflated because the majority of stocks that are listed are traded only 
occasionally, or not at all. Consequently, market capitalization does not necessarily have 
to reflect the real stock market activity. This problem could be solved by using data from 
the first tier of the market, which usually includes companies that are actually traded. 
However, such data are not available from all the transition economies‟ stock exchanges 
and, what‟s even worse, the rules for including companies in the first tier differ from 
country to country. Nevertheless, the market capitalization to GDP variable is used in our 
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 The merger of several exchanges into a new entity (Kazakhstan in 1997, Bulgaria in 1998), the decision 
of stock exchange authorities to list a certain group of securities that had not been listed before (Latvia in 
1999), the macroeconomic development in a given country (Poland in 1993), and trading system 
enhancements initiated by the stock exchange and liberalization of block trading (Lithuania in 1997). 
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analysis to show the influence of different privatization methods on the size of the 
emerging stock market.  
In contrast to the market capitalization variable, the indicators of liquidity do 
indeed reflect the real stock market activity, and are not “spoiled” by a high number of 
non-traded stocks listed on a particular stock exchange. Moreover, Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000) consider increases in this measure essential especially for emerging markets, since 
higher liquidity raises investors‟ confidence in the values of information and risk 
diversification associated with trading, which further encourages the inflow of capital.  
We employ two measures of liquidity. The first one, market turnover ratio, can be 
expressed in currency units or as a share of market capitalization. Share of market 
capitalization reflects the value of stocks traded divided by the value of listed stocks; that 
is, trading relative to the size of the stock market. The second measure of market liquidity 
is value traded, which equals the value of stocks trading divided by GDP. Hence, it 
relates the value of trading to the size of the whole economy and does not really measure 
the liquidity of the market (Beck and Levine, 2004). This indicator faces a potential 
problem, however, if prices of stocks increase because of expectations concerning higher 
corporate profits. In such a situation this liquidity measure, as well as market 
capitalization, would increase without a rise in the number of transactions, thus not 
reflecting the true stock market activity. To eliminate this price effect, Levine and Zervos 
(1998) suggest either using both capitalization and value traded together, or using 
turnover indicator instead. Turnover ratio is not influenced by price changes as it contains 
the price in both numerator and denominator. Therefore, based on the available data we 
primarily use this measure as an indicator of stock market development in the transition 
countries.  
Another indicator that we employ to monitor the development of stock markets in 
transition economies is the amount of new capital raised through a particular stock 
exchange. In this respect we are interested not only in capital raised by already existing 
companies, but primarily by newly admitted enterprises (IPOs). In most of transition 
economies, however, the number of IPOs was insignificant, especially in relation to 
market capitalization. Nevertheless, we consider new capital raised to be very important, 
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as it shows the real functioning of the market and fulfilling its main role of providing 
financial resources to enterprises. But even though this indicator may seem appropriate, 
one has to be aware of its possible shortcomings, namely the fact that data on new capital 
raised in the context of transition economies do not necessarily reflect the real situation, 
since not everything recorded as “new capital raised” conforms to its true definition30.  
As an example we provide the problem of mergers: in some cases these were recorded as 
new capital raised, whereas in fact this was capital that had already existed on the stock 
exchange, only under a different name. Another possibility concerns changes in ISIN that 
could result in recording an issue with a new ISIN as new capital even though it was 
simply different “labeling” of this capital. In our analysis, we only use data from one 
source in which the above-described problems are already accounted for, although the 
disadvantage is that such data is available only for a limited number of countries
31
. 
All in all, in order to investigate the development of transitional stock markets 
from different perspectives we employ the following variables: market capitalization to 
GDP; total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP; turnover ratio; and total 
amount of new capital raised as a percentage of market capitalization. We conjecture that 
the negative effect of privatization is going to influence different variables in a different 
way, based on their nature. We anticipate a sudden increase of market capitalization after 
mass privatization, while on the other hand stocks traded and turnover ratio as the 
indicators of liquidity are expected to decrease, especially over the medium term. When 
employing new capital raised the same pattern as for liquidity measures is expected.  
The above discussion suggests that all of these stock market indicators face 
some potential shortcomings. Nevertheless, taken together, they can provide a reasonable 
picture of tendencies in stock market development in transition countries.  
                                                          
30
 The World Federation of Exchanges defines new capital raised by shares to be the amount of new capital 
raised through the sale of new shares issued by a new issuer (company) through an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), capital increases by already listed companies (reserved to previous shareholders), and SPOs (new 
shareholders subscribe the shares). This is the definition that we also adhere to. 
31
 In this case there are 14 of them. 
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1.7 Estimation results 
The outcome of our estimation is discussed according to the stock market indicators used 
as dependent variables. 
 
 MARKET CAPITALIZATION TO GDP 
Results showing the influence of mass privatization on market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP are provided in the following Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2: Estimations of the main model for market capitalization to GDP 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION TO GDP Coefficient Standard error R
2
 R
2 
(within) 
Contemporaneous effect           
Privatization dummy (priv) 1.523   2.468 
0.114 0.271 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  1.454 *** 0.206 
One year lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) 2.767   2.213 
0.116 0.272 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  1.406 *** 0.219 
Two years lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) 3.3 * 1.845 
0.128 0.268 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  1.354 *** 0.237 
Observation/country  195/23 
Note: The table contains results for fixed effect regression. We report estimated coefficients as 
well as their significance (***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%) and 
standard errors.  Constant term is included but not reported. 
 
The estimated coefficients are positive and mostly significant. This is in line with our 
expectations of the positive influence of mass privatization on market capitalization. The 
coefficients for dummy variables including linear trend are all significant, indicating the 
evolving influence of mass privatization on stock market development. The privatization 
dummy variable without trend is only significant when two years lag is considered. As 
expected, this coefficient is positive due to the fact that the shares of privatized 
companies were simply put on the market in the majority of countries. The significance of 
the lag only is most probably the result of the time gap between the official start of 
privatization and its real implementation when companies finally entered the stock 
exchange. It suggests that privatization did not greatly influence stock markets initially.  
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 Within R
2 
is much higher than overall R
2 
which confirms the importance of 
country specific fixed effects. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the economic 
environment in individual transition economies varied considerably, especially with 
respect to the different initial conditions and sequencing of reforms.  
 
 GROWTH IN STOCKS TRADED  
As expected, the impact of privatization on the growth in value of stocks traded (as % of 
GDP) is negative and mostly significant. While most coefficients are significant, the R
2
 
measure is much lower than in the case of market capitalization. We posit that the value 
of stocks traded in comparison to market capitalization was likely influenced by 
privatization only indirectly.  
     Table 1.3: Estimations of the main model for growth in stocks traded 
GROWTH IN STOCKS TRADED Coefficient Standard error R
2
 
R
2 
(within) 
Contemporaneous effect           
Privatization dummy (priv) -3.748 *** 0.934 
0.031 0.197 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -0.12 ** 0.063 
One year lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) -0.347   0.723 
0.030 0.068 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -0.169 *** 0.073 
Two years lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) -0.728   0.639 
0.032 0.074 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -0.146 ** 0.077 
Observation/country 132/21 
Note: The table contains results for fixed effect regression. We report estimated coefficients as 
well as their significance (***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%) and 
standard errors.  Constant term is included but not reported. 
As Table 1.3 reveals, the immediate effect of privatization on stock trading is 
significant only in the first case when the effect of privatization is not lagged. The 
introduction of huge numbers of new shares to the stock exchange might have confused 
investors and thus they needed time to adjust to the new situation and start their trading 
activities again. The negative effect is also reflected in significant results for the 
privatization dummy variable that includes linear trend. Thus, trading as an indicator of 
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stock market liquidity crucial for healthy stock market development is, in fact, negatively 
influenced by mass privatization and traditional stock market development is thwarted.  
Despite the fact that the negative effect of mass privatization persists with time, 
we do not consider it permanent; it relates solely to the transition period that we 
investigate. Recent development of stock indices in major transition countries supports 
this statement.
32
 Regardless of initial problems and related costs, market forces have 
tended to win out over the long run and contribute to the stabilization of stock markets in 
transition economies. 
    TURNOVER RATIO 
This is another indicator of stock market functioning that supports our previous results 
and the initial hypothesis. We consider the following outcome even more important, 
especially due to the better quality of the turnover ratio indicator which is not spoiled by 
price changes or by a high number of listed companies after privatization, and which 
reflects the true liquidity of the market.  
           Table 1.4 shows that the average effect of mass privatization is significant for all 
three specifications. All significant coefficients are negative, which only substantiates the 
unfavorable influence of privatization on stock markets.  
   Table 1.4: Estimations of the main model for turnover ratio as dependent variable 
   TURNOVER RATIO Coefficient Standard error R
2
 
R
2 
(within) 
Contemporaneous effect           
Privatization dummy (priv) -72.448 *** 17.77 
0.117 0.211 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1.523   1.209 
One year lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) -43.612 *** 15.03 
0.101 0.137 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1.594   1.303 
Two years lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) -24.887 ** 12.968 
0.08 0.081 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1.678   1.399 
Observation/country  112/18 
Note: The table contains results for fixed effect regression. We report estimated coefficients as 
well as their significance (***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%) and 
standard errors.  Constant term is included but not reported. 
                                                          
32 The Prague Stock Exchange index PX50 recovered to its initial 1994 level of 1,000 only in 2004.  
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 NEW CAPITAL RAISED 
This indicator of stock market development accounts for the capital raised through IPOs 
in transition countries. With the exception of Poland, there have been just a few IPOs in 
other transition countries and thus the number of observations for this indicator of stock 
market development is lower than in the previous cases. This fact most probably also 
influences the R
2
 measure. Nevertheless, the importance of this indicator has increased 
over time as IPOs on the stock markets of transition countries have become more 
common. 
The estimated coefficients are significant only in the case when linear trend is 
taken into account (see Table 5.1). It is obvious that privatization cannot influence the 
amounts of new capital raised immediately since the process of raising capital requires a 
lot of preparations and takes a lot of time. The estimated coefficients that are significant 
all exhibit negative sign, which is in line with our hypothesis that mass privatization had 
negative influence on the functioning of the emerging stock markets.  
 
   Table 1.5:  Estimations of the main model for new capital raised as dependent variable 
NEW CAPITAL RAISED Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
R
2
 
R
2 
(within) 
Contemporaneous effect           
Privatization dummy (priv) 5801.7   12303.4 
0.014 0.077 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1263 *** 527.2 
One year lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) 4568.1   7648.1 
0.016 0.080 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1331.3 ** 545.2 
Two years lag           
Privatization dummy (priv) 5446.9   5850.6 
0.026 0.089 
Privatization dummy with trend (tr.priv)                                  -1481.3 *** 571.9 
Observation/country  85/14 
Note: The table contains results for fixed effect regression. We report estimated coefficients as 
well as their significance (***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%) and 
standard errors.  Constant term is included but not reported. 
 
1.7.1 Robustness check 
We have checked robustness of our results by implementing several robustness checks. 
First, in all of the above-described estimations, we included a dummy variable for the 
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1998 Russian crises. As the influence of the crises was not strong enough in all transition 
countries, this dummy variable did not figure significantly in our estimations. 
      Another modification of the basic model that we test is the inclusion of a quadratic 
trend. We consider all the modifications of the main model with different lags and 
dependent variables to which we include privatization dummy variable with quadratic 
trend. The results that we obtain reveal the same pattern as our main results.  
       Last but not least, estimations of the basic model with several different measures of 
stock market performance that provide consistent results supporting negative influence of 
mass privatization can also be considered a robustness check for our results. 
In our view, the simple estimation procedure performed above is appropriate both 
with respect to the data sample we have available and to the main objective of our 
investigation – uncovering a possible connection between mass privatization and stock 
market development. Data sufficiency problems occur if we want to include the 
development of stock markets over time as an inseparable part of the transition process. 
In such a case, we would need to add a trend for each country‟s development. This kind 
of estimation is not possible with the small data sample as we have available. If more data 
is available, we expect further research in this area will be feasible. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
We use available data from a majority of transition economies to provide empirical 
evidence for our hypothesis that mass privatization influenced stock market development 
and exerted a negative impact on stock market functioning in these countries. The results 
of our estimation, which accounted for privatization method and country effects, 
validated the hypothesis in the short and medium run. The connection between mass 
privatization and stock market development was confirmed using different indicators of 
stock market development.  
In accordance with our expectations, market capitalization to GDP increased 
following mass privatization which could in general mean a good news for the emerging 
markets. Nevertheless, increasing market capitalization alone is not enough, bigger 
market does not necessarily need to be a more efficient one. If this was connected with 
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increasing liquidity and more capital raised, only then we could have concluded that 
privatization contributed to positive development of the emerging stock markets. 
Nevertheless, this was not the case in transition countries. Our liquidity indicators 
confirm that most shares traded occasionally or not at all resulting in negative coefficients 
for privatization dummy variable when the value of stocks traded and the turnover ratio 
were used to measure stock market development. This trend was quite visible over the 
medium term. Moreover, we find negative connection between mass privatization and the 
amounts of new capital raised which indicates that the emerging markets are not able to 
perform one of their main functions. 
Our results further imply that in countries using mass privatization approaches, the 
stock market was established and perceived only as a by-product of the privatization 
process. These stock markets did not initially fulfil their main economic function of 
providing capital resources to enterprises. Such non-transparent markets offering 
thousands of securities naturally diminished investor confidence and did little to jump-
start economic growth in transition economies. Despite an unfavourable beginning, the 
main stock indices in transition economies have shown improvement in last years. It 
seems that resources in the transition economies would have been used more efficiently 
had a more careful approach to stock market creation been adopted.  
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APPENDIX 1    
 
      Table A1.1: Primary and secondary privatization method implemented in transition    
countries  
Country 
Primary method Secondary method 
Direct sales MEBOs Vouchers Direct sales MEBOs Vouchers 
Albania  *    * 
Armenia 99→  →99  *  
Azerbaijan
X 01→  * *  2001→ 
Belarus  *    * 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  * (99→) *(99→)   
Bulgaria *     * 
Croatia  *    * 
Czech Republic   * *   
Estonia *     * 
FYR Macedonia  *  *   
Georgia   * *   
Hungary *    *  
Kazakstan 99→  * *  99→ 
Kyrgyz Republic   *  *  
Latvia 99→  * *  99→ 
Lithuania   * *   
Moldova   * *   
Poland *    *  
Romania  *  *   
Russia   * *   
Serbia and  
Montenegro 
Serbia  Monten. *   
Slovak Republic *     * 
Slovenia  *    * 
Tajikistan 99, 2002→ 98,2001  2000, 2001 2002→ 98,99 
Turkmenistan  *  *   
Ukraine   *  *  
Uzbekistan  *  *   
      Source: EBRD Transition Reports (1998 –2004) 
       Note: Data for Serbia and Montenegro are available only from 2003 
                X – Direct sales in Azerbaijan took the form of cash auctions in 2000 and  
                       then were also used since 2002. 
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Table A1.2: Taxonomy of mass privatization 
Country 
Year voucher  
distribution 
began 
Shares issued 
in waves - W or 
continuously -C 
Vouchers  
Investment  
in funds 
Fund  
management 
Albania 1995 Continuously Bearer Encouraged Independent 
Belarus 1995 Continuously Bearer Encouraged Self-managed 
Russia 1992 Continuously Bearer Encouraged Self-managed 
Armenia 1994 Continuously Bearer Allowed Independent 
Kyrgyz Republic 1994 Continuously Bearer Allowed Independent 
Estonia 1993 Continuously Tradable Allowed Independent 
Georgia 1995 Continuously Tradable Allowed Self-managed 
Latvia 1994 Continuously Tradable Allowed  
Lithuania 1993 Continuously Nontradable Allowed Independent 
Slovenia 1994 Continuously Nontradable Allowed Independent 
Ukraine 1995 Continuously Nontradable Allowed Self-managed 
Bulgaria 1995 Waves Nontradable Encouraged Self-managed 
Czech Republic 1992 Waves Nontradable Encouraged Independent 
Moldova 1994 Waves Nontradable Encouraged Independent 
Slovak Republic 1992 Waves Nontradable Encouraged Self-managed 
Kazakhstan 1994 Waves Nontradable Compulsory Independent 
Poland 1995 Waves Nontradable Compulsory Independent 
Romania 1992 Waves Nontradable Compulsory Self-managed 
Romania 1995 Waves Nontradable Encouraged  
 
Source: Estrin S., Stone R. (1997): “Taxonomy of Mass Privatization,” In Lieberman I., Stilpon 
N., Raj D. (Eds): Between State and Market: Mass Privatization in Transition Economies, The 
World Bank and OECD. 
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Table A1.3: Models of mass privatization  
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
FOLLOWING  
THE MODEL 
Russian 
               shares issued continuously 
bearer vouchers 
funds encouraged 
Belarus 
Armenian 
shares issued continuously 
bearer vouchers 
funds allowed 
Georgia 
a
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lithuanian 
shares issued continuously 
nontradable vouchers 
funds allowed 
Estonia 
b
 
Latvia 
b
 
Slovenia 
Ukraine 
Czech-Slovak 
shares issued in waves 
nontradable vouchers 
funds encouraged 
Bulgaria 
Moldova 
Romania (1995) 
Polish 
shares issued in waves 
nontradable vouchers 
funds compulsory 
Kazakhstan 
Romania (1992)
c
 
 
Source: Estrin S., Stone R. (1997): “Taxonomy of Mass  
Privatization,” In Lieberman I., Stilpon N., Raj D. (Eds):  
Between State and Market: Mass Privatization in Transition 
Economies, The World Bank and OECD. 
Notes: 
a.  it is not clear whether vouchers are bearer or registered 
b. vouchers tradable for all or part of their validity 
c.  certificates of ownership in the funds were distributed in  
one wave but the exchange of the certificates for shares  
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       Table A1.4: EBRD indicators of financial system reform for transition countries 
CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTICS (CEB) 
Country EBRD index of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech 
Republic 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Estonia 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
1.7 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 
Hungary 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Latvia 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.0 3.0 
Lithuania 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Poland 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Slovak 
Republic 
banking sector reform 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 
Slovenia 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
SOUTH EAST EUROPE (SEE) 
Albania 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
banking sector reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 
Bulgaria 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 
Croatia 
banking sector reform 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 
FYR 
Macedonia 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Romania 
banking sector reform 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
banking sector reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.0 
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COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES (CIS) 
Country EBRD index of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Armenia 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Azerbaijan 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Belarus 
banking sector reform 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Georgia 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Kazakhstan 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Moldova 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Russia 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
2.0 3.0 3.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.7 
Tajikistan 
banking sector reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Turkmenistan 
banking sector reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Ukraine 
banking sector reform 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Uzbekistan 
banking sector reform 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
reform of non-bank 
financial institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
             
         Source: EBRD Transition reports 
Note: value 1 in both cases corresponds to little progress in the reform, value 4+ represents 
the standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies. 
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Table A1.5: Stock market development indicators of transition countries and their   
comparison with developed economies 
Country  
Market capitalization 
to GDP 
Stocks traded  
(% of GDP) 
Turnover ratio 
Armenia  0.75 0.03 5.77 
Azerbaijan  0.07 na na 
Belarus 3.66 na na 
Bulgaria  4 0.4 13.07 
Croatia  13.96 0.87 4.18 
Czech Republic  20.83 8.51 42.11 
Estonia  27.49 10.03 16.66 
FYR Macedonia 0.73 0.65 na 
Georgia 2.93 0.11 na 
Hungary  15.93 10.72 51.93 
Kazakhstan  7.68 0.35 24.54 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.52 1.07 58.14 
Latvia  5.87 1.16 20.9 
Lithuania  11.45 1.54 23.03 
Moldova  14.5 2.05 24.53 
Poland  8.93 3.82 71.8 
Romania  3.21 0.6 38.45 
Russia  16.79 5.48 21.07 
Serbia and Mont. 2.01 0.62 na 
Slovak Republic  7.09 4.69 102.94 
Slovenia  11.08 2.81 23.31 
Ukraine  5.4 0.44 8.6 
Uzbekistan  0.83 0.24 108.73 
Argentina  27.7 3.7 23.19 
Brazil  25.65 11.59 42.49 
EMU 44.56 36.2 103.16 
Germany  36.04 36.42 134.25 
Ireland  63.21 25.62 54.56 
Korea, Rep. 41.9 74.1 168.67 
Mexico  27.12 9.16 34.22 
United Kingdom  131.69 70.42 64.16 
United States  105.9 124.12 129.93 
         Note: All the numbers are averages of the available data for the period 1989 – 2003 
          Source: WDI Database 
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   Table A1.6: Definitions and data sources of the variables included in the analysis 
VARIABLE NAME SOURCE DEFINITION 
Market capitalization  
to GDP 
WDI database;  
based on Standard & 
Poor's Emerging Stock 
Markets Factbook 
the share price times the number of  
shares outstanding  
(% of GDP) 
Growth of value traded 
WDI database;  
based on Standard & 
Poor's Emerging Stock 
Markets Factbook 
value traded refers to the total value 
of shares traded during the period 
(% of GDP) 
Turnover ratio 
WDI database;  
based on Standard & 
Poor's Emerging Stock 
Markets Factbook 
total value of shares traded during the  
period divided by the average market  
capitalization for the period 
New capital raised http://www.fibv.com 
capital raised by all listed companies  
(% of market capitalization) 
Mass privatization 
dummy variable 
EBRD, taxonomy of mass 
privatization 
dummy variable that equals one 
starting from the period when mass 
privatization was implemented as 
primary or secondary privatization 
method in a given country  
(value 0 before it started) 
 
 
      Table A1.7: The main descriptive statistics of stock market indicators used  
Variable Obs. Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Market capitalization to GDP 195 23 9 9.9   0 53.2 
Stocks traded  to GDP 168 21 3.3   5.5   0 34.1 
Turnover ratio  112 18 38.4   38.2   0.02 180 
New capital raised 85 14 2 325  13 504 0 100 874 
 
     Source: The data set used for estimations, the author‟s calculations 
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Figure A1.1: Development of stock market indices in some transition economies  
Czech Republic (index PX50) 1994 - 2006 
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Source: Prague Stock Exchange 
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Source: Bloomberg and Bratislava Stock Exchange 
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Hungary (BUX index) 1991 - 2006 
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        Source: Bloomberg 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CAN A WRONG ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION BE FIXED 
AGAIN? MASSIVE DELISTING ON THE PRAGUE STOCK 
EXCHANGE
33 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Development of emerging stock markets has differed across transition countries. Some of 
the countries have followed a standard, so called “top-down”, approach to stock market 
development characterized by gradual growth of market capitalization and the number of 
securities listed. A bottom-up approach, on the other hand, started with a large number of 
listed shares out of which only some have survived on the market (Simoneti, 1997). Thus, 
despite the expectations of growth in the number of listed securities as well as the 
amounts of trade, some stock markets in transition economies have, after the initial boom, 
experienced massive delisting, i.e. a large proportion of the listed share issues was 
excluded from public trading within a relatively short period of time. This massive 
delisting together with virtually no new listings pointed out problems in fulfilling the 
main functions of the stock market
34
, which based on our conjecture, may have the roots 
in the way these markets were established. 
The phenomenon of delisting is to certain extent a common occurrence in 
developed economies as well
35
. Nonetheless, the number of delisted share issues is 
                                                          
33
 For valuable comments and suggestions I am grateful to Tom Berglund, Randall Filer, Jan Hanousek, Jan 
Kmenta, Iikka Korhonen and Jan Švejnar, participants of the BOFIT summer workshop in Helsinki (June 
2006), the Czech Economic Society Conference in Prague (November 2006) and XVI International "Tor 
Vergata" Conference on Banking and Finance in Rome (December 2007). While working on this paper, I 
have benefited from GACR Grant No. 402/05/1014. 
34
 For example they did not fulfill their information function, see Hanousek and Filer (2000) who show that 
prices were disconnected with reality. Unlike Poland and Hungary, the Czech stock prices did not 
correspond to economic values in the period 1993 – 1999. 
35
 See for example Macey et al. (2004). 
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insignificant compared to the size of the market. According to the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) Factbook 6% of NYSE companies were delisted in 1997
36
. In the  
same year, 75% of companies were delisted from the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). 
When considering these amounts it is, however, necessary to account for the number of 
new listings as well.  In this respect, transition economies in general fall behind the 
developed ones as there have only been several new listings and thus just a few 
companies entering the market through initial public offerings on the majority of these 
emerging stock markets (Köke and Schröder, 2002; Bakker and Gross, 2004).  
Delisting from the transition markets can be viewed from several different 
perspectives. Firstly, it indicates that in some cases unsuitable companies were initially 
placed to the market. Here delisting undoubtedly benefited the market because these 
companies left the market and thus it became more transparent. On the other hand, 
delisting in transition economies could hurt small investors with minority holdings
37
 
because there were no exit rules defined at the time of delisting. Furthermore, massive 
delisting in conjunction with practically no new listings contributed to shrinking of the 
market, which then offered fewer investment opportunities and thus free resources had to 
be invested elsewhere, usually abroad. 
This situation still concerns the Czech stock market where the number of liquid 
securities traded on the stock exchange is relatively low
38
. Despite high expectations, 
there have been no initial public offerings between June 2004
39
 and December 2006 and  
                                                          
36
 The proportion of companies delisted from the NYSE within a year has not exceeded 10% in the period 
1995 – 2002 (NYSE Factbook). 
37
 As it was the case for example in Bulgaria. For more detail see Atanasov et al. (2005). 
38
 In fact, liquid securities are only the ones that belong to SPAD (System for Support of Share and Bond 
Market). In 2006 there were 11 of them, at the end of 2008 the number was 14 (for more details see the 
Prague Stock Exchange webpage www.pse.cz). This number was low not only in comparison to other 
similar transition countries (e.g. Poland or Hungary, see Table A2.1 in the appendix) but also in comparison 
to countries with a similar level of GDP per capita (e.g. in Portugal there were around 50 shares listed on 
the main market or South Korea where there where more than 600 listed shares). For more details see 
Euronext Lisbon Fact book and the statistics of the World Federation of Exchanges. 
39
 The first successful IPO of Zentiva took place in June 2004. Zentiva is traded in SPAD, it also became 
part of PX-50 index and the value of its shares has almost doubled since its entry. The PSE expected several 
potential followers of Zentiva in 2005, however two cases of only dual listing took place: Orco and Central 
European Media Enterprises and it seems that Zentiva‟s IPO did not inspire other companies. Two share 
issues (ECM Real Estate Investments A.G. and Pegas Nonwovens SA) have however entered the stock 
exchange in December 2006. 
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investors therefore invest their free resources also abroad. This way they in fact indirectly 
finance growth of the foreign economies while growth of the Czech economy can be 
hindered
40
. On the other hand, there was a growing trend in the number of listed 
securities since the beginning of trading on the Warsaw and Budapest Stock Exchange 
(see Table A2.1 in the appendix). These markets are still attracting new companies, which 
come also from abroad.  Thus, unlike the Czech market, they have already managed to 
provide capital to the corporate sector, especially through IPOs. 
Taking into account the implemented institutional and other reforms, we suspect 
that differences in the development of the Czech and Slovak market on one hand and the 
Polish or Hungarian stock market on the other, have been the result of policies applied in 
the early stages of the transition process; most importantly privatization which, based on 
Korhonen et al. (2000), lays the foundation for the development of securities markets. In 
Poland and Hungary the primary privatization method was direct sales, while in the 
Czech Republic it was voucher privatization
41
, which even nowadays remains the subject 
of much discussion and controversy (Megginson, 2005). This method, as the analysis in 
the first chapter suggests, has exhibited a negative short run impact on the emerging stock 
markets in transition countries.  
Czech voucher privatization can therefore be regarded as an experiment which 
allows us to investigate under what conditions a viable stock market arises. In this paper 
we analyze this by employing firm-level data. Using the data on listed and delisted 
companies we show that it was possible to prevent massive delisting if certain pre-
privatization and privatization characteristics of the companies had been taken into 
account when deciding which companies to place on the stock exchange for public 
trading following the voucher privatization. 
 The following section provides detailed description of the stock market 
emergence and the delisting process on the Prague Stock Exchange. Section 2.3 examines 
determinants of delisting. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we discuss specifications of estimated 
                                                          
40
 Analysts estimate that this way the Czech economy could lose as much as 1.5% of its growth (Ekonom 
3/2005). 
41
 Primary privatization based on the classification in the EBRD Transition Reports.  
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models and the data used. Then, results, their interpretation and robustness follow in 
section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 Privatization and stock market development in the Czech Republic 
The Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) started trading in the early 1990‟s as one of the first 
stock exchanges in the transition countries
42
. Its establishment and further functioning 
was closely related to voucher privatization, which was implemented in two waves. This 
privatization method was selected because it enabled relatively fast transformation of 
ownership rights. Furthermore, voucher privatization, at the time when it was 
implemented, was considered to be rather simple, equitable and transparent and thus also 
socially and politically acceptable (World Bank, 2002). Any possible drawbacks were 
regarded as temporary, with the market expected to be strong enough to solve them and 
enable necessary ownership concentration (Ježek, 1997)43. Unfortunately, such 
expectations did not materialize. Voucher privatization failed to concentrate companies‟ 
ownership structure, minority shareholders‟ rights were harmed, foreign investors were 
not attracted and new capital necessary for companies‟ restructuring was not generated 
(Lieberman, 1997). 
Moreover, voucher privatization incurred certain “hidden” costs that were not 
recognized at the beginning and only became obvious during or even after its 
implementation. These costs concern the evolution of necessary market institutions of the 
type that function in the developed market economies
44
. The stock market is undoubtedly 
one of them. It was considered to be an important means of enabling the transfer of 
ownership rights, the main goal of privatization (World Development Report 1996). Thus 
the stock market was formally set up at the beginning of the 1990s, following the end of 
the first wave of voucher privatization. Under this privatization scheme shares of all 
privatized companies were legally required to be mandatory listed on the stock 
                                                          
42
 In fact the Prague Stock Exchange was reopened in the early 1990s because the trading in securities 
existed there even before the WWI. 
43
 Ježek (1997) describes the situation after privatization when capital market was not regulated at all as 
false liberalism. 
44
 “Czech officials deem it more important to privatize state property quickly than to settle in advance the 
details of a market economy,” (The Economist, 1993) 
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exchange
45
 (PSE Monthly Report, May 1997). Even though listing requirements
46
 for 
companies desiring to enter the market were formally defined by 1993, privatized 
enterprises were not subject to them. This is not a standard approach towards stock 
market creation because privatization authorities not companies themselves were the ones 
to decide on listed companies. Although the managers in the privatized companies  
prepared the privatization plans themselves and chose to participate in the voucher 
privatization program
47
, later evidence from the stock exchange indicates that they did not 
know that this privatization method was connected to the mandatory listing of their 
shares
48
. Moreover, at the time of submission of their privatization projects to the 
responsible ministries, virtually no legislation concerning the stock market and its 
functioning was in force
49
.  
 The above description suggests that the approach to market creation adopted in 
the Czech Republic was a pure administrative decision that ignored the usual listing 
requirements and suppressed the traditional concept of stock market development. 
Consequently, companies that under standard conditions would prefer to be privately 
owned ended up being public right after the PSE was opened. The PSE started trading on 
April 6, 1993 and by June 22, 1993 622 share issues from the first wave of voucher 
privatization were being traded there. Just a few weeks later, on July 13, 1993, the rest of 
                                                          
45
 Even though the listing was mandatory, not all the privatized companies appeared on the stock exchange. 
In the first wave 988 companies were privatized, however, only 955 share issues were listed on the stock 
exchange. Unfortunately, even the stock exchange authorities cannot explain this difference. Following the 
second wave there were 674 share issues listed and three issues were not listed because of their limited 
transferability. However, altogether 861 enterprises participated in the second privatization wave.  
46
 Listing requirements at that time concerned the volume of an issue earmarked for public offer (min. 100 
mil.CZK i.e. 3.4 mil. USD), percentage of an issue realized through public offer (min. 20% of the total 
volume of an issue) and the length of issuer‟s existence (min. 2 years). In fact, a lot of companies that were 
placed on the stock exchange after privatization did not satisfy these requirements. 
47
 This was envisaged already before the actual privatization started: “Most companies will join, either 
voluntarily or on the orders of the government, a give-away scheme based on investment vouchers.” (The 
Economist, 1991). Moreover, Kotrba (1995) suggests that authorities “recommended” voucher privatization 
to be the most suitable method.  
48
 PSE Monthly Report (May 1997) mentions that some issuers were surprised when they were told about 
their stocks being listed on the stock exchange. This is in line with a general view that many mass 
privatization programs were slow to recognize the natural link between privatization and development of 
capital market (Lieberman, 1997). 
49
 Companies were obliged to submit their privatization projects by October 31, 1991 for the first 
privatization round and by July 16, 1992 for the second round. A commercial code was enacted on 
November 5, 1991 and a securities law on November 20, 1992. This indicates that even the policymakers 
were not fully aware of the connection between mass privatization and the stock exchange at the beginning.  
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the share issues (333) from the first wave entered the market. The number of securities 
grew further following the second wave of voucher privatization, when the market was 
“filled” with the new issues for the third time (PSE Monthly Report, May 1997). Then, 
674 share issues from the second wave were introduced on March 1, 1995. Continuing 
the trend of a growing number of issues, the highest number of security issues ever 
registered on the exchange (a total of 1,792) was achieved on May 2, 1996. Market 
capitalization to GDP reached 31.3% in 1996, which was much higher than in any other 
transition economy. Similar figures at that moment were 11.66% in Hungary, 6.42% in 
Poland and 9.5% in Russia (EBRD Transition report). This number is comparable to the 
market capitalization figures in developed economies, however, when adjusted for the 
size of public sector and investment fund holdings, the actual market capitalization in 
1997 was 13.7% (Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 1999)
50
. 
Hence, in line with Rozlucki (2001), voucher privatization to a large extent 
influenced the development of stock markets. Table A2.2 in the appendix shows that 
voucher privatization in the Czech Republic was followed by lively trading. This was 
basically the result of a liberal regulatory framework and a multiplicity of trading 
channels (Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 1999). Speculators were trying to take 
advantage of the stock market boom in the early 1994. Afterwards emerging market funds 
from abroad entered the market. However, due to the condition prevailing at the market, 
they have left it relatively soon, generally by the fall 1996 (PSE Monthly Report, 
February 1997). Accordingly, as the PSE report further stresses, “the true foreign 
portfolio investors have not entered the market and domestic investors did not particularly 
care to invest in the securities either”. Furthermore, the new market was rather 
nontransparent. This was not only due to a large number of listed securities but also 
because most of the transactions were conducted off the main market. In 1996 and 1997 
as much as 88.5% and 91.1% respectively of all trades at the PSE were conducted as 
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 State holdings were deducted as they were not traded in reality. The value of investment funds holdings 
was also deducted because the value of their shares was added to the value of securities in which they were 
invested, thus they were double counted. Then, as the funds‟ own shares were valued at an average discount 
of about 40 percent relative to the portfolio value of the shares in which they were invested, this market 
value of investment funds shares was added. For more detail see: Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 
1999). 
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direct and block trade (Hanousek and Podpiera, 2004). Therefore the price-setting central 
market on the PSE remained relatively insignificant and the prices did not carry the true 
information. Then, after the foreign investors left and ownership structures consolidated, 
the main indicators of the Czech stock market functioning started to worsen (see Table 
A2.2 in the appendix). This fact is not only reflected in the development of prices and 
liquidity
51
 but also in a sharp decrease in the number of listed securities since an 
exceptionally large number of securities were delisted
52
 within a relatively short period of 
time (see Figure A2.1 in the appendix).  
 
2.2.1 Delisting process 
PSE authorities were trying to improve the market‟s situation. To make the market more 
transparent and provide a better arrangement for the trading of hundreds of securities, a 
segmentation of the market was introduced in September 1995. The listed market was 
split into main and secondary markets, and the formerly unlisted securities were 
transformed into the free market. The securities on the main and secondary market had to 
fulfill certain requirements
53
 (certain minimal public offer, liquidity criteria, providing 
economic information about the company) while the free market did not impose any 
obligations on the securities. A large number of unlisted securities did not meet criteria of 
the public market (PSE Monthly Report, May 1997). Therefore, the PSE authorities 
decided to reduce the number of the security issues traded and delist, i.e. exclude from 
public trading, issues that did not conform to the current requirements of the market. The 
PSE authorities also took into account the sensitive nature of such a decision, especially 
with respect to the significant part of the Czech population that took part in the voucher 
privatization. In this respect “the decision concerning delisting could not be commenced 
too early and 1997 seemed to be sufficiently far from the end of voucher privatization” 
(PSE Monthly Report, May 1997).  
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 Even though standard turnover figures were relatively high, they were misleading especially due to 
multiple counting of transactions (which were the result of the structure of the market) and the associated 
dealing practices (for more detail see Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 1999). 
52
 Exceptionally large number when considered as a percentage of companies listed on certain stock 
exchange. 
53
 For more detailed description see the Prague Stock Exchange Factbook 1996. 
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The process of delisting started at the end of 1996 (in December a trial round of 
12 securities were delisted) when stock exchange employees even discussed this issue 
personally with all the affected issuers
54
. Until that time only an insignificant number of 
securities was delisted from the PSE. The reasons for delisting were mostly bankruptcy 
and limited transferability of the securities i.e. the delisting decision was not made by the 
PSE authorities. In 1997, however, the PSE began to play an important role in the 
delisting process. The PSE (Monthly Report, May 1997) cites the following factors to be 
crucial for the delisting decision: 
 time of registration on the PSE (at least one year) 
 value of trades on the central market 
 value and frequency of direct and block trades 
 market capitalization of the issue 
 number of trading sessions with a non-zero value of trades on the central market 
 ownership structure 
 voluntary disclosure of the information on the issuer and the issue 
 possible interests of the National Property Fund 
There were four major waves of massive delisting in 1997 taking place on March 20th, 
April 1st, June 2nd, and October 1st. Altogether 1301 issues were excluded from 
trading55. For each of these delisting waves certain criteria for delisting were set. They 
are listed in the following Table 2.1. 
A majority of listed companies were delisted in 1997. In the first wave 100 free 
market issues were delisted, in the second 391 issues, the third one concerned 509 share 
issues and the last one included 301 issues. In the first three waves for each delisted 
security a combination of two of the above mentioned three requirements for the period 
of the preceding twelve months had to be met, value and capitalization or value and the  
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 Based on the PSE Monthly Report (May 1997), some issuers were surprised when they were told that 
their stocks were registered on the exchange, other issuers welcomed their delisting almost enthusiastically. 
55
 Delisted share issues were afterwards listed on the RM-system (OTC market). Most of the delisted issues 
were delisted from RM-system as well, majority of them later than one year after delisting from PSE. 
Nowadays, only 3% of the issues delisted from PSE in 1997 are still traded on the RM-system.  
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number of trading sessions
56
. For the fourth wave of delisting both the condition 
concerning minimal traded value as well as the number of days when an issue was traded 
on the central market had to be fulfilled. The period under consideration was again the 
preceding twelve months.  
Table 2.1: Delisting criteria set by the PSE  
                (all of them concern the period of the preceding 12 months) 
CRITERION 1
st
 and 2
nd
 wave 3
rd
 wave 4
th
 wave 
Traded value in the preceding  
12 months less than 
USD 6,300 USD 18,900 USD 47,300 
Market capitalization less than  USD 157,000 USD 631,000  
Number of days when security 
was traded on the central market 
less than 5 less than 80 less than 200 
Displaced issues 100; 391 509 301 
Source: Prague Stock Exchange, author‟s calculations (based on the yearly average exchange rate 
reported by the Czech National Bank) 
Figures in this table show that the delisted companies were very small ones that 
would normally not be placed on a stock exchange under standard listing conditions. 
They were a fraction of the size of companies that were entering other transition markets 
at that time (e.g. an IPO that took place on the Budapest Stock Exchange in 1997 had the 
value of USD 4.477 mil.). Moreover, they even did not fulfill the official listing 
requirements at the PSE valid in 1997
57
. 
Afterwards, in 1998 only an insignificant number of securities was delisted, most 
of them because of the issuer‟s decision. In 1999, 75 issues were excluded from the free 
market on September 20th. They were already excluded from the pricing central market 
on February 15, 1999 due to low liquidity. This decision was meant to further contribute 
to increasing the transparency of the market. The amended Security Act, which entered  
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 The PSE claims that except for the above mentioned conditions also other issues were accounted for 
when deciding about delisting: value and frequency of direct and block trades, the structure of the company 
owners, providing information about the issuer and the security issue to the stock exchange and trading 
conducted at the international stock exchanges. Even though these criteria are mentioned by the PSE, it 
does not explain how they were taken into account.  
57
 Volume of the part of the issue released through public offer had to be at least USD 3.4 mil. and 
proportion of the issue released through public offer in the total volume of the issue at least 20%. In 
addition the issuer had to be in business for at least two years (PSE Monthly Report, February 1997). 
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into force on May 1, tightened the conditions for admitting and keeping securities in 
public markets
58
 and thus contributed to yet further delisting. However, the number of 
additional companies was low. Together there were 34 share issues delisted in 2001. 
Further, in 2002 and 2003 only 14 and 10 issues, respectively, were delisted, followed by 
another 10 issues in 2004. This trend continued in 2005 and 2006 when 16 and 9 
companies, respectively, were delisted, all of them based on the issuer‟s decision. Figure 
A2.1 in the appendix and the following Table 2.2 provide a more comprehensive picture 
of delisting on the PSE.  
 
Table 2.2: Reasons for delisting firms from the Prague Stock Exchange in 1993 – 2006 
reason/year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
decision of the authority   1 11 1210 1 65 4 13 7 2    
PSE               
Ministry of Finance   1            
decision not specified               
sanction of the PSE board    1    1 1      
trading group cancelled       65        
insufficient liquidity    10 1210   1       
low liquidity and high 
own. concentration 
         5     
low marcap and liquidity         9 2 2    
low marcap, liquidity and 
high own. conc. 
        3      
information duties      1  2       
decision of the issuer 6 7 12 37 10 6 11 14 17 5 8 10 16 9 
issuer‟s request  2 4 1 2   1 2 2 5 10 9 3 
end of public trading 2  3 29 7 6 11 13 15 3 3    
limited transferability 4 5 5 7 1          
squeeze out             7 6 
bancruptcy related 3 3 6 13 5 4 3 10 4 2     
start of chapter 7 or 11  1  7 3 2 2 2 1 1     
start of liquidation    1    1 1      
liquidation 3 2 6 5 2 2 1 7 2 1     
Total delisted 9 10 19 61 1225 11 79 28 34 14 10 10 16 9 
Delisted (% of listed at 
the beginning of  year) 
 1 1.9 3.6 73.4 3.4 26 14.4 22.5 13.7 12.7 15.4 29.1  
Source: Prague Stock Exchange and author‟s calculations 
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 Admission to the main and secondary market required the issuer to be in the business for a minimum of 
three years (before it was only two years). The disclosure duties on the free market were expanded. 
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Figures in this table confirm that massive delisting took place on the PSE 
especially in 1997 when almost 80% of all delisted companies left the market, most of 
them due to insufficient liquidity. Such a sharp decline in the number of traded shares in 
conjunction with almost no new companies entering the market did not contribute to the 
desired development of the newly created market. This leads us to the investigation of the 
effects and determinants of delisting in transition economies which is lacking in the 
relevant literature. Our research thus helps answer the question if and how it had been 
possible to prevent this situation and this way ensure a more standard development of the 
emerging stock market. In more general terms we are interested to investigate under what 
circumstances a viable market for shares arises. 
 
2.3 Determinants of delisting 
Based on the above description of stock market development in the Czech Republic, we 
assume that there exist certain indicators according to which it would have been possible 
to predict delisting. Delisting indicates an effort of the market mechanism to remedy the 
wrong decision of privatization authorities as most of the enterprises excluded from 
public market were not natural candidates for public trading. Privatization is therefore the 
most important criterion when identifying the determinants of delisting in the Czech 
Republic. This approach sheds light on the structure of factors that played an important 
role in the delisting process and also indicates that certain determinants were decisive 
from the very beginning i.e. it was possible to account for them even in the pre-
privatization period. Factors connected to privatization are important because they are 
connected to the concentration of ownership. If the pre-privatization and privatization 
determinants turn out significant, it could point out that the decision to place all the 
privatized companies to the stock exchange when the stock market was not functioning 
yet and could not bear such a high number of securities, was not the best one from the 
point of view of stock market development. In this respect emerging market did not 
necessarily have to be strong enough to deal with this situation as the authorities were 
stressing. Even in the case of important financial centres the government played essential 
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role in kick-starting financial development since laissez-faire approach and secured 
property rights alone were not sufficient (Andrianova et al., 2008).  
Based on the above discussion, we consider delisting to be a function of the 
following three groups of factors: 
)_;;_( privpostprivprivprefdelisting    (2.1) 
The first group covers pre-privatization characteristics (pre_priv) of the companies, the 
second is related to the privatization process (priv) and the third one concerns post-
privatization (post_priv) factors
59
.  
 PRE-PRIVATIZATION FACTORS 
These factors contain general characteristics of companies prior to privatization. They 
include the industry to which a given company belongs
60
, the size of the company as well 
as indicators of its financial “health”. We measure the size of the company by the number 
of employees and also the total number of the company‟s shares61. Larger companies are 
expected to be less prone to delisting as their size makes them more natural candidates for 
public trading. Moreover, it should be much harder to obtain a controlling share in a big 
company. For financial indicators we have available the indicators of sales, profit and 
debt scaled by the company‟s capital. These are available for the three years before the 
privatization took place. However, all of these indicators are based on socialist 
accounting practices which do not necessary provide a true picture of a company‟s 
situation. This will be taken into account when discussing the results of our estimations. 
 PRIVATIZATION FACTORS 
This set of delisting determinants relates to the privatization process and its aftermath. 
We distinguish two privatization waves while also taking into account the companies that 
were privatized in both of these waves. An important source of information is the 
privatization project that was prepared by the managers of each company before the 
actual privatization took place and that was finally accepted. Here the expected ownership 
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 This qualification of determinants is based on the timing of information and therefore we do not consider 
interactions between these factors. 
60
 We use PSE classification.  
61
 Equal to company‟s book value since the nominal value of original shares was 1000 CZK. 
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structure was indicated and we use the data concerning shares of the company owned by 
the National Property Fund (NPF). A higher ownership share of the NPF indicates the 
interest of state in a given company. The reasons leading to this decision ranged from the 
intention of the state to implement necessary structural changes in a given company to 
preventing the company from misusing its monopoly position (NPF Annual Report 
1995). As the objective of the NPF was to show how well stock market works and thus 
keep its companies publicly tradable, the probability of delisting in these cases can be 
considered rather low.  
The attractiveness of certain companies in the privatization process is reflected in 
the average price for which the shares were sold in the auctions. Companies with a better 
future outlook and thus with a lower probability of being delisted should be characterized 
by a relatively higher average price of their shares. Different proportions of companies‟ 
assets were offered in mass privatization, a factor that is reflected by the ratio of the 
number of shares in mass privatization to total number of shares. The ownership structure 
that arises right after the privatization is crucial for further development of the company. 
The proportion owned by individuals as well as investment privatization funds is 
expected to play a role here.  
 POST-PRIVATIZATION FACTORS 
We first consider the development of the financial indicators after privatization and the 
consolidation of the ownership structure as these could reveal companies that would most 
likely be delisted. The indicators that are investigated include sales, profit, operational 
profit, total liabilities and value added, all scaled by total assets. Moreover, the sales 
variable is used to calculate growth opportunities for a company, defined as the growth 
rate between the current and following year of average sales in a given industry, 
excluding the company itself. The same calculation is applied to the operational profit 
data to obtain potential profit figure. 
Further, trading on the stock exchange could also be taken into account. One of 
the main trading characteristic is the frequency of trading of the stock. Even if this 
indicator is low, it does not have to lead to delisting on the developed market because it 
only indicates that the distribution of beliefs is the same among traders. In the Czech case, 
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however, a low frequency of trading was one of the conditions for delisting set by the 
PSE. On the other hand, a high frequency of trading can be considered a good signal, 
particularly if this trend persists over time. An irregular pattern of trading intensity can 
indicate either a consolidation of ownership structure following mass privatization or an 
attempt to influence the price and consequently a potential tender offer price for minority 
shareholders (Atanasov et al., 2005). In this respect the development of price and price 
differentials can help clarify the situation. Another feature of trading is trading in blocks. 
If there are many block trades that significantly influence the price, there is a probability 
of price manipulation leading to tunneling and further delisting. Nevertheless, the usage 
of trading characteristics as determinants of delisting can cause difficulties in the 
estimations because of the possible endogeneity problem. This problem arises if we 
assume that market is functioning properly in a sense that it already takes into account the 
fact that some of the privatized companies should not be listed on the stock exchange. If 
this assumption holds, the fact that the frequency of their trading is low just indicates that 
market expects these companies to be delisted and thus endogeneity problem is present. 
Nonetheless, we will estimate the model in a reduced equation form in which 
simultaneous effects will not be taken into account. Therefore we will consider only the 
determinants of delisting that do not concern trading on the stock exchange.  
  In comparison to our previous discussion, the official reasons for delisting 
provided by the responsible authorities are defined rather broadly
62
. Table 2.2 in section 
2.2 provides them in more detail. It shows that the most important reasons for excluding 
firms from public trading in the Czech Republic are based on the decision of the 
authorities, mostly the PSE. The most commonly mentioned reason is insufficient 
liquidity of securities (about 80% of delisted securities). Then, the end of public trading 
based on the decision of the issuer follows (about 6% of delisted companies) and more 
than 4% of companies were delisted in 1999 when their trading group on the PSE was 
cancelled. The number of companies delisted due to other reasons is insignificant when  
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 In this respect it is important to note that the time of delisting also plays a role here. The later certain 
security was delisted, the more precisely the reasons for its delisting were defined. In fact, in 1997 when the 
highest number of firms was delisted the appropriate reasoning was not provided for all the delisted 
companies.  
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we consider them in relation to all 1510 delisted companies. It is thus clear that the 
reasons for delisting provided by the PSE are not sufficient in order to explain the 
phenomenon of delisting and a more careful investigation is necessary. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
Delisting is modelled as a zero-one phenomenon, i.e. the company is still traded on the 
stock exchange (0) or it is delisted (1). We estimate a linear probability model where the 
dependent variable is the probability of delisting. It equals one for the companies that 
were delisted. The explanatory variables belong to the three groups of factors described in 
the previous section (equation 2.1) and thus the estimated model has the following form:  
iiii privpostprivprivpreyP __)1(   (2.2) 
We also take into account possible connections between variables in different groups. It 
has already been mentioned that the average share price in a privatization auction reflects 
the attractiveness of a given company for investors. Thus, if we assume that market 
functions well and the future prospects of a company are already included in this price, 
the post-privatization profit variable could be connected to the average price. This could 
lead to an endogeneity problem and spoil our results. To account for this problem, we use 
the growth in sales and the growth in operational profit instead of plain operational profits 
and sales as indicators of the post-privatization development. Both of them are defined as 
the growth rate between the current and the following year of average value in a given 
industry, excluding the company itself. As the company under consideration is not 
included in the construction of these indicators, we consider their usage appropriate to 
solve possible endogeneity problem.  Furthermore, these indicators are suitable to 
describe the post-privatization development. Growth in sales accounts for the 
opportunities the company has in its own industry and operational profit variable shows 
the profitability i.e. resources available inside the companies. The actual model that we 
finally run on the whole data sample has the following specification: 
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where 
 del is a dummy variable that equals 1 for company that was delisted before the end 
of 2006 and 0 for not-delisted 
 tns is total number of shares of a company (in millions of shares) 
 npf is the share of company owned by the National Property Fund that was indicated 
in the company‟s privatization project 
 prof_tns is profit per share one year before privatization 
 ap is average price of company‟s shares in the privatization auction (in points) 
 wave stands for a dummy variable which equals one if the company was privatized 
in the first privatization wave 
 both is a dummy variable that equals one for companies privatized in both waves 
 opro_gr is growth in operational profit defined as the growth rate of average 
operational profit in the industry (between 1996 and 1997), excluding the company 
itself 
 sales_gr stands for growth opportunities, defined as the growth rate of average sales 
in the industry (between 1996 and 1997), excluding the company itself 
 mills is the inverse Mills ratio63 
This inverse Mills ratio enables us to account for the missing financial data problem. 
Even though our sample contains all the companies privatized under the voucher 
privatization scheme, we face the problem of missing observations, due to the fact that 
not all the companies were willing to report their financial results. This was possible 
because market supervision as well as law enforcement after privatization were weak. 
The presence of missing observations leads to a sample selection bias problem that we 
address by employing a two stage estimation (Heckman, 1979). The main part of this 
estimation constitutes the linear probability model described above. In order to obtain the 
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 It is the ratio of the probability density function for the standard normal over its cumulative density 
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inverse Mills ratio for this model we investigate the firms that do not report information 
about their profits before and after the privatization and consider the factors determining 
their decision. This approach is a Heckit regression where we employ probit estimation in 
the first stage and a linear probability model in the second. We have chosen linear 
probability model for several reasons. Firstly, it allows to instrument for profit and in 
comparison to logit it provides consistent estimates under standard assumptions (Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001). Moreover, the linear probability model can be corrected for sample 
selection.  
The probit regression, with the dependent variable being missing financial data 
as a binary response, that we estimate first has the following form: 
)4.2()1( iiiiii missindipfownersizeconstselP  
where size accounts for the size of the company
64
 and its proportion privatized in the 
voucher privatization. The set of variables concerning the ownership structure (owner) 
described in the privatization project includes dummy variables for domestic and foreign 
owners as well as restitutions, National Property Fund share, municipalities and selling 
via intermediaries. IPF stands for the actual ownership shares owned by the investment 
privatization funds following the privatization. We further account for the industry to 
which a given company belongs (ind)
65
. Moreover, we define a dummy variable based on 
the firm‟s reporting or non-reporting in the pre-privatization period (miss). If a company 
has not reported some of its financial indicators before
66
, we believe that there is a high 
probability that it will continue doing so also after privatization.  
Except for this basic two stage model where we only distinguish between delisted 
and not delisted share issues, we also employ a more precise classification of companies. 
It concerns the three main reasons for delisting: decision of the authority, decision of the 
issuer and bankruptcy related reasons. The determinants of delisting may be different for 
each of these subgroups. The results of preliminary investigation confirm that the  
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 We also add quadratic term to this variable, since we expect the relationship to be nonlinear. 
65
 We use PSE classification. 
66
 At least two out of the three pre-privatization indicators are missing in our sample. 
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proportions of missing observations are not significantly different when accounting for 
different delisting reasons (see Table A2.8 in the appendix) and therefore there is no need 
to estimate the model in two stages as the one above where we only distinguished 
between delisted and not delisted companies. Rather, we run multinomial logit estimation 
based on a similar model specification as before (equation 2.3), where the dependent 
variable takes four different values. They account for not delisted firms, firms delisted 
due to decision of the authority, issuer and bankruptcy respectively. 
Besides binary regression model, another possibility to estimate delisting is 
survival analysis employing a hazard model. The dependent variable in this case is time 
elapsed until a given company becomes delisted. The fact that delisting in most cases 
occurred in the waves can however cause problems with identification of such a model. 
The actual date of delisting is not that important for this analysis and moreover, it may 
even be affected by other factors of a mainly technical and administrative nature. 
Therefore, we prefer to conduct the analysis by using several variations of binary 
regression model instead. 
 
2.5 Data description 
Our data set includes the population of firms privatized in the first and the second wave 
of the voucher privatization program. Altogether it contains 1664 medium and large non-
financial companies that traded on the Prague Stock Exchange following privatization. 
Data concerning privatization come from the Ministry of Privatization of the Czech 
Republic as well as the Ministry of Finance (privatization projects, pre-privatization 
data). They concern the period 1992 – 1995. The data on holdings after the first and 
second privatization wave come from the Prague Securities Centre database. Financial 
data, together with the post-privatization ownership structure of the companies are from 
the private database ASPEKT
67
 which is based on the annual reports as well as 
information provided to the stock exchange and companies‟ shareholders. Here, the time 
period of interest are years 1995 – 1997 i.e. after privatization and before the major 
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 ASPEKT database is a Czech source for AMADEUS, a pan-European database containing financial 
statements data. All financial statements in our data set are audited.  
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delisting. Finally, the Prague Stock Exchange provided data about delisting for 1993 - 
2006. Details concerning changes in the legal status of delisted companies (bankruptcy, 
merger, acquisition) were taken from the Czech companies register
68
. Description of the 
variables used in the estimation is provided in the appendix (Table A2.9 in the appendix). 
 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Different characteristics of the companies are investigated for the whole sample as well as 
for the subcategories of delisted and not delisted companies. Differences between these 
subsamples are tested using nonparametric tests
69
. Furthermore, in the delisted subgroup 
we distinguish the waves of delisting as well as the different reasons for which the 
companies were delisted. Descriptive statistics show that the data for all the companies 
and subgroups included in analysis are characterized by a very high degree of variability. 
This pattern is especially visible when considering median and quartile coefficients
70
.  
 Pre-privatization firm size is measured by the number of employees as well as the 
total number of firm‟s shares in the voucher privatization (see Table A2.3 in the 
appendix). The absolute number of employees decreases for both delisted and not delisted 
subgroups with approaching privatization. This decrease is more significant for the 
delisted companies and within this subgroup especially for companies that were delisted 
due to bankruptcy. The general decrease in the number of employees before privatization 
can be attributed to the overall transition process and restructuring, which was taking 
place at the beginning of the 1990s. The difference between the number of employees 
three years and one year before privatization shows the dynamics of the ongoing 
restructuring.  Analysis of the number of employees variable, however, faces a problem 
of missing observations, with the number of observations three years before privatization 
much lower in comparison to what is available for one year before privatization. 
Furthermore, the data concerning the number of employees for the firms included in our 
sample is not available for the period after privatization. Therefore, we focus on the total 
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 www.justice.cz. By further existence we mean existence of the company‟s capital. Therefore if a company 
merged with some other company, its capital is still in use and we consider this acceptable for our purposes.  
69
 We use nonparametric K-sample test on the equality of medians and the Wilcoxon ranksum test. We do 
not provide the exact outcomes of these tests here but they are available upon request. 
70
 Detailed results are not part of this paper but are available at http://home.cerge-ei.cz/fungacova. 
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number of shares which reflects the capital or “book value” of a given company as our 
size measure. Moreover, thanks to this pre-privatization measure we can use total assets 
variable for the after privatization period because it basically measures the same thing as 
the total number of shares variable.  
The total number of shares indicator, similar to the number of employees variable, 
shows that delisted companies are significantly
71
 smaller than their counterparts that 
remain listed on the stock exchange. Companies delisted based on the decision of the 
authority are smaller than companies delisted for other reasons. This result indicates the 
effort of the PSE to consolidate the situation on the stock exchange and correct the wrong 
administrative decision of placing all the privatization companies‟ shares on the public 
market. Moreover, companies delisted in the four main waves in 1997 and before are 
significantly smaller than the ones delisted afterwards. Results for the total number of 
shares variable thus confirm our expectation that the size of a company measured by the 
amount of company‟s capital is an important predictor of delisting, result found also for 
Bulgaria (Atanasov et al., 2005). This trend is confirmed by the distribution of companies 
listed on the PSE by size (Figure A2.2 in the appendix).  
On the other hand, the pre-privatization financial characteristics (sales, debt, and 
profit) do not differ significantly for the subgroups of companies that we consider (see 
Table A2.4 in the appendix). This could be attributed to the fact that restructuring was 
only beginning in the early 1990s as there was no private ownership at that time. 
Consequently, its effect cannot yet be visible in the financial indicators. Another possible 
explanation is that this data is based on socialist accounting practices which were 
different from western standards, reflecting the amount of production rather than the 
profitability of the companies
72
. Nevertheless, the amount of debt increases for companies 
that are not delisted as the time of privatization approaches. This could indicate their 
effort to restructure. It is important to note, however, that the number of observations of 
debt available in our sample is lower than for the other financial indicators, meaning that 
not all the companies were willing to provide this information to the public. Similar to 
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 For more details see Filer and Hanousek (2002). 
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debt, the profit variable also worsens for all the companies as privatization draws nearer. 
Profit, especially, decreases one year before privatization starts. This trend can most 
probably be attributed to the overall transition process and the abrupt changes that were 
going on in the economy at that time. However, the difference between sales three years 
and one year prior to privatization shows a significant difference between subsequently 
delisted and not delisted companies. Even though sales tend to increase for both 
subgroups, the increase for companies that were not delisted was significantly higher.  
The average price of shares in the privatization process (see Table A2.5 and Table 
A2.6 in the appendix) was significantly higher for companies that were not delisted (see 
also Figure A2.3 in the appendix), indicating that these companies were more attractive 
for investors. Within the delisted subgroup, the average price is higher for companies 
delisted after 1997. All of these findings show that bidders in the privatization process 
were able to distinguish between “good” and “bad” companies and evaluate future 
prospects of a given company. Companies delisted based on the decision of the issuer 
exhibit higher average price than those delisted for other reasons. The fact that despite a 
relatively high average price they were delisted may indicate that the owners themselves 
found out that there is no reason for having company shares publicly traded due to the 
company‟s size and other company characteristics. On the other hand, one could 
speculate that the delisting decision of owners may also indicate possible tunneling in a 
given company.  
Furthermore, when distinguishing the wave in which a given company was 
privatized, a difference in average price between the delisted and not delisted subgroups 
is apparent. The average price is significantly higher for the companies that belong to the 
second wave. The difference between the first and second wave may be attributed to the 
fact that the investors might have already acquired experience while bidding in the first 
privatization round. Moreover, the stock exchange had already been established by the 
time of the second wave and was functioning as a kind of bridge between the real and the 
“fictive” i.e. voucher point price based on the socialist accounting standards.  
The privatization factors that we consider also include variables describing the 
ownership structure that arose right after privatization. Investment privatization funds‟ 
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holdings differ significantly after the second privatization wave for all the subgroups of 
companies that we consider (see Table A2.7 in the appendix). Funds‟ holdings are higher 
for delisted companies, which indicates that there was a higher probability of funds‟ 
owners exercising their power over the companies. When accounting for time of 
delisting, the results indicate that funds‟ holdings in companies delisted in and before 
1997 are higher in comparison to the rest of the delisted companies. The reason for the 
significant differences only in the second wave holdings could be the announcement that 
the second privatization wave was the last one which made investors who were really 
interested in some company obtain as many of its shares as possible.  
The third group of indicators concerns the period after privatization. We consider 
the following post-privatization financial characteristics: profit, operational profit and its 
growth, sales and their growth, total assets, total liabilities and value added
73
. Similar to 
our expectations, the above described nonparametric tests that we apply confirm that 
these characteristics are significantly different for delisted and not-delisted companies, as 
well as for the reasons and time subgroups within the delisted group.  
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2.6 Estimation and results 
In order to estimate the influence of different factors on delisting we run the above 
described two stage Heckit regression on the sample including all companies ever listed 
on the PSE. The linear probability model (equation 2.3) provides us with the results 
summarized in the following Table 2.3. 
All the explanatory variables included in the model with the exception of the pre-
privatization profit indicator are significant. Moreover, the estimated effects exhibit the 
expected signs. There are two possible explanations for the non-significance of the pre-
privatization profit. The first one is connected to the fact already mentioned, the quality of 
the data from the pre-privatization period. The indicator of profit in this case does not 
reflect profit but production and therefore does not necessarily reveal the true picture of a 
situation in a given company. The other explanation is the possibility of tunneling.  
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Table 2.3: Linear probability model for delisting (y=1 for delisting) 
  
Linear probability model Interpretation 
Pre-privatization factors 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Overall effect (one st. 
deviation change) 
Total number of shares (millions of shares) -0.0226 ** 0.010 -4% 
Profit before privatization (scaled by book value) 6.5E-06  0.0003 0.01% 
Privatization factors 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
National property fund ownership -0.003 *** 0.001 -4.26% 
Average price in voucher auction (in points) -0.001 *** 0.0003 -5.66% 
Average price (squared) 1.1E-06 *** 2.5E-07 0.31% 
Average price (overall effect)     -5.35% 
Privatization wave -0.055 *** 0.015  
Privatized in both waves -0.057 ** 0.028  
Post-privatization factors 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
Operational profit growth -0.0001 **** 3.9E-05 -2.65% 
Growth opportunities (sales) 0.006 *** 0.001 4.31% 
Mills ratio (sample selection) 0.353 *** 0.087  
Constant 0.885 *** 0.027  
Number of observations 1,470 
  
  Adjusted R
2  0.148 
 Note: The table contains estimation results for the linear probability model. We report  
 estimated coefficients as well as their significance (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%  
and *** significant at 1%). In the linear probability model estimated coefficient correspond  
to the marginal effect.  
The significance of other factors indicates that delisted companies exhibited, 
before and during the actual privatization, different characteristics from the companies 
that remained on the stock exchange. Especially the size of the company (measured by the 
total number of shares which corresponds to company‟s book value) and the ownership 
structure described in the privatization project have played a role here. These results 
confirm our expectations with larger companies having a lower probability of being 
delisted. A one standard deviation change in the size of company measured by total 
number of shares, decreases probability of delisting by 4 percent (the last column in the 
above Table 2.3). More specifically, this result says that the increase in the size of 
company by a million shares decreases the probability of delisting by 2.26 percent. The 
significance and magnitude of the results indicate that, as we have argued earlier, not all 
the companies privatized in voucher privatization were suitable candidates for immediate 
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placement on the stock exchange. Size of the company could have been considered one of 
the decisive factors for the necessary filtering to prevent the emergence of a non-
transparent market.  
In addition to company size, the proportion of shares held by the National 
Property Fund (NPF) could serve as a predictor of possible delisting. Our results show 
that an increase in the amount of shares owned by the NPF by one percent decreases the 
probability of delisting by 0.3 percent, which is in the one standard deviation change 
measure as much as 4.3 percent. This is because the state tends to play a special role in 
the ownership structure and in this case it also indicates the future intensions of state 
towards the privatized company
74
. Another important privatization factor is the average 
price of the privatized companies‟ shares. As we expect to find a nonlinear relationship 
between average price and delisting, average price is also included in quadratic form. A 
higher price indicates higher valuation of the company by bidders
75
 and thus, greater 
expected future prospects and lower probability of being delisted. The results of our 
estimation support this hypothesis. An increase in the average price by ten voucher points 
decreases the probability of delisting by 1 percent. A one standard deviation increase in 
price decreases the probability by 5.35 percent. Thus, the average price in the voucher 
auction turns out to be one of the most important predictors of delisting.  
Another decisive factor is the wave in which a given company was privatized. Our 
results suggest that the probability of delisting is 5.5 percent lower for companies that 
were privatized in the first privatization wave and 5.7 percent for those that were 
privatized in both waves. This result is in line with findings of Gupta et al. (2000) who 
provide evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first in the Czech Republic.  
Massive delisting took place in 1997, and thus also post-privatization company 
characteristics are expected to influence delisting. We consider operational profit which 
is, in comparison to the pre-privatization profit, based on standard accounting practices 
and, unlike the overall profit variable, better reflects the real functioning of a given  
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company because it does not include extraordinary items. The years under consideration 
are 1996 and 1997; this time period directly follows privatization and at the same time 
precedes the main waves of delisting. As already mentioned, due to a possible connection 
between profit and the average price in the privatization auction we construct an 
operational profit growth variable based on the operational profit growth in a given 
industry.  Its estimated coefficient is significant and its sign indicates that decrease of 
growth in operational profits by one percentage point increases the probability of delisting 
by 0.01 percent, which in the standard deviation change measure translates into 2.65 
percent. This result corresponds to our expectations, even though the effect is not as 
strong as in the case of pre-privatization and privatization factors, which play key role in 
explaining delisting.  
The estimated model also considers future prospects of a listed company. We 
include a forward looking indicator that accounts for company‟s growth opportunities. As 
described in the methodology section, it is based on the growth of sales in a given 
industry. Similar to our expectations, the estimated coefficient is significant. One would 
expect it to have a negative sign, so that probability of delisting would decrease with 
higher growth opportunities. It is however, positive, and one standard deviation increase 
in the growth opportunities constitutes a 4.3 percent increase in probability of delisting. 
This means that future prospects play a role in delisting but our result also suggests that 
the new owners can despite promising future exercise their power and tunnel the 
company. 
The inverse Mills ratio turns out significant which suggests that the unwillingness 
to report financial results plays a role in the delisting process and the two stage estimation 
procedure is necessary. R
2 
as a measure for goodness of fit is not very high, however, 
taking into account the structure of the model and a relatively high number of delisted 
companies we cannot expect it to be much higher. We employ McNemar-type of test 
suggested by Hanousek (2000) to compare our model to a naive estimator on the basis of 
their predictive accuracy. This can be interpreted as a test of the significance of the 
model. The quality of prediction summarized in Table A2.10 in the appendix and the 
corresponding high value of 
2
 confirm that our estimator highly dominates the naïve 
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estimator in terms of prediction accuracy
76
. Thus, the estimated model is significant and 
supports our hypothesis, that there exist several economic measures, especially from the 
pre-privatization and privatization period, based on which delisting of certain company 
could have been predicted and that could have been used when deciding which companies 
to place on the stock exchange for public trading after the voucher privatization. 
 
2.6.1 Reasons for delisting  
Besides distinguishing between delisted and not delisted companies, we also account for 
the delisting reasons. There are three main categories of reasons for delisting we 
distinguish based on the information from the PSE: decision of the authority, decision of 
the issuer and bankruptcy related reasons. We deem it important to examine the 
determinants of delisting for these categories and as explained in the methodology section 
we employ a multinomial logit model to do it. It has the form of the basic model 
(equation 2.3) without Mills ratio but the dependent variable is different in this case. It 
can take four different values:  
 0 for companies that were not delisted 
 1 for companies delisted based on the decision of the authority 
 2 for companies delisted on the issuer‟s request  
 3 for bankruptcy related delisting 
The estimation results uncover differences between groups of companies delisted due to 
different reasons. As Table 2.4 shows, the most significant results are obtained for the 
subgroup delisted due to the decision of the authority. This result is most probably also 
due to the size of this subgroup, as it contains as many as 1200 observations (which 
comprise 82% of the whole sample). The results for companies delisted due to the 
decision of the authority are in line with the results obtained for the basic model. The 
marginal effects that are reported stress the importance of company size, which is the 
most influential determinant of delisting because the probability of delisting decreases by 
30% when increasing the number of shares by one million. Nevertheless, unlike the basic  
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model, the coefficient for the National Property Fund (NPF) variable is insignificant here. 
This may indicate that the significance of the NPF variable in the basic model was 
primarily driven by the companies that were not delisted. However, now when we 
distinguish subgroups of companies in more detail, the effects across them differ and the 
NPF variable becomes significant even for smaller subgroups. 
Table 2.4: Multinomial logit model based on different reasons for delisting 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT Decision of the authority Decision of the issuer Bankruptcy related 
Pre-privatization factors coefficient dP/dX coefficient dP/dX coefficient dP/dX 
Total number of shares (millions) -2.345 *** -0.296 0.003  0.127 0.046  0.05 
Profit before privatization  
(scaled by book value) 
-0.0031  0.001 -0.034  -0.002 -0.0005  0.0002 
Privatization factors             
National property fund ownership -0.003  0.002 -0.035 *** -0.002 -0.022 * -0.0004 
Average price (in points) -0.016 *** -0.002 0.003  0.001 -0.007  0.0001 
Average price (squared) 2.8E-05 ** 5.9E-07 -1.2E-05  -2.0E-06 -0.0001  -3.0E-06 
Average price (together)    -0.002    0.001    -0.0003 
Privatization wave -1.081 *** -0.13 -0.118  0.049 0.111  0.026 
Privatized in both waves  -0.695 ** -0.082 -0.325  0.012 0.584  0.033 
Post-privatization factors             
Growth opportunities (sales) 0.053 *** 0.004 0.030  -0.001 0.0471 * 0.0002 
Operational profit growth -0.001 ** -0.0001 -0.0003  0.0001 -0.002 ** -3.2E-05 
Constant 3.758 *** 0.491 0.041   -0.196 -1.051 * -0.11 
Number of observations 1,656 
Scaled R2  0.245 
Note: The table contains estimation results for the multinomial logit model where reasons for delisting are 
taken into account. The results for not delisted companies are not reported (it is possible to count them 
based on these numbers as the sum of probabilities equals 1). We report estimated coefficients, their 
significance (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%) as well as marginal 
effects (dP/dX) for the particular reasons for delisting. 
 
Yet, the effect of a lower number of observations is visible on the significance of 
the other coefficients for companies delisted in the two other subgroups. When 
interpreting these results there is another issue that needs to be taken into account. 
Companies delisted based on the issuer‟s request can be of two types. The first one is 
represented by the companies that are objectively, especially due to their size or area in 
which they operate, not appropriate candidates for public trading and their owners 
decided to delist in order to correct the wrong administrative decision that followed 
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voucher privatization. On the other hand, there are companies that their owners wanted to 
delist because they did not want to disclose information about the company to the public. 
These two issues then contribute to splitting this subgroup containing a relatively low 
number of observations even more and consequently it is not possible to expect any 
significant results. Despite this fact, as we have already mentioned, the ownership share 
of the NPF plays a significant role in the decision of the issuer subgroup. Increase of the 
share owned by the NPF by one percentage point decreases the probability of delisting by 
0.2 percent. This result only confirms that companies where NPF has an ownership share 
are not expected to be delisted, especially if the reason for delisting is the decision of the 
issuer. The strong position of the NPF is visible also in the subgroup delisted due to the 
bankruptcy, where the NPF ownership variable is significant as well but its effect is much 
smaller (0.04 percentage points). The most important variable for the bankruptcy related 
subgroup is the operational profit growth variable. This is exactly what one would expect, 
as operational profit is a crucial indicator of a company‟s functioning. Even though its 
effect is significant, it is not very high. Thus, despite the fact that not all the results in this 
specification turn out significant, there are visible trends that confirm differences between 
companies delisted due to different reasons that are in line with our expectations and 
previous estimations. 
Defining reasons for delisting based on the information we have available is rather 
difficult and thus it is possible to view it from several different perspectives. In the 
estimations conducted above we were mostly considering the reasons provided by the 
stock exchange. The most common reason for delisting defined by the stock exchange 
was insufficient liquidity. Until now we have treated it as a decision of the authority. In 
the alternative classification we consider companies delisted because of the insufficient 
liquidity to be part of the group delisted due to the decision of the issuer. This is because 
insufficient liquidity indicates the presence of a dominant owner, who in case he does not 
want his company to be publicly traded in fact does not have to do anything. Since the 
free float is low, he is only waiting until the company is delisted because of insufficient 
liquidity. This further opens a discussion about delisting de facto and de jure. Delisting de 
jure is the official delisting reported by the stock exchange, while delisting de facto 
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concerns the real behavior of the issuers. When taking delisting de facto approach, 
delisting due to insufficient liquidity can be considered a decision of the issuer. As a part 
of sensitivity analysis, we consider an alternative division of companies based on the de 
facto delisting approach and run the multinomial logit model described above on the new 
subgroups. The estimation results correspond to the ones already reported. The most 
significant results are obtained for subgroup with the highest number of observations and 
the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are in line with the results of our 
basic model. The results for the subgroup of companies delisted due to bankruptcy, which 
stays the same as in the original division, remain basically unchanged. All of this thus 
reconfirms our previous results.  
2.6.2 Robustness check 
All of the above-described estimations have also been carried out on the subsample that 
includes companies that were delisted in 1997 in the four major waves as well as those 
that have survived 1997. The companies in this subsample are the most important ones 
from the point of view of delisting as this phenomenon was relatively rare and 
insignificant before 1997. The estimations on this subsample have shown the same 
pattern of results as were described for all the companies. In this way we have in fact used 
this subsample to check the robustness of our results. 
 Furthermore, we have also included industrial dummies in the linear probability 
model estimated as the second stage of Heckit regression. The industrial dummies were 
defined rather broadly and we only distinguish between heavy and light industries. Even 
when including these dummies, the estimated coefficients of other explanatory variables 
remained basically unchanged, which once again confirms robustness of our results. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In its short history the Czech stock market, unlike the Polish or Hungarian one, 
experienced massive delisting of shares and virtually no initial public offerings. 
Nevertheless, delisting in the Czech Republic was necessary due to the fact that all the 
privatized companies were simply placed on the market by the administrative decision 
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following the voucher privatization. Interestingly enough, except the Czech Republic, 
massive delisting was also observed in other transition countries
77
 where the initial 
background was similar to the Czech one: voucher privatization. Massive delisting in 
conjunction with almost no new companies entering the market put off the development 
of these markets. Accordingly, all of them seem to lack behind the other transition 
countries, as shown in Chapter 1. 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of delisting and point out that it was 
possible to prevent this situation. The results of our estimation indicate that there exist 
several factors based on which it was possible to identify companies that were going to be 
delisted even before the actual delisting took place. These characteristics include the size 
of the company, ownership share of the National Property Fund, average price of 
company shares in the privatization process, privatization wave as well as company‟s 
future prospects. Furthermore, company‟s non-reporting in the pre-privatization period 
plays a role in the delisting process as well. Most of these determinants of delisting are 
connected to the pre-privatization and privatization period. This indicates that it could 
have been possible to prevent delisting if these issues had been taken into account when 
deciding which companies to place on the stock exchange for public trading following the 
voucher privatization. Taking into account the overall development on the PSE we 
conjecture that massive delisting did not only serve to correct the wrong decision of the 
privatization authorities by “cleaning” the market of unsuitable shares but it also sent a 
signal concerning the functioning of the whole market. Cleaning itself had a positive 
effect in the long run because the market became more transparent. Nevertheless, in the 
short run delisting seems to have a negative effect on the price development and the size 
of the market. 
This development suggests that governments making the important decisions 
concerning privatization programs and influencing emerging stock markets should be 
very careful when choosing which companies will be privatized using a particular method 
and based on which criteria these companies will be placed on the stock exchange. If a  
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proper filtering of companies had been implemented in the Czech Republic before 
placing privatized companies on the stock exchange, a more transparent stock market 
fulfilling its main economic functions would have emerged after the privatization. This 
result can also be supported by comparing the Czech market to its counterparts in Poland 
and Hungary where the stock market evolved gradually and there was no massive 
delisting of shares. By taking into account their development one could speculate that 
massive delisting in the Czech Republic was one of the decisive factors causing the fact 
that there were virtually no new listings on the PSE. Then, with only a few liquid 
securities, there were not enough investment opportunities neither for foreign, nor for 
domestic investors. This is important especially with respect to the ongoing pension 
system reform because the pension funds are usually required to invest some portion of 
their portfolio on the local market. If there are no suitable share issues available, they may 
end up buying only government bonds and investing more abroad, meaning that their 
economy could be deprived of this capital and they will in fact be financing the growth of 
some other country. Such an unfavorable development may, based on recent empirical 
studies, have implications for the country‟s further economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2.1: Companies listed and traded on the Warsaw and Budapest Stock Exchange 
  Warsaw Stock Exchange Budapest Stock Exchange 
  
New 
listings 
Listed 
companies* 
Total 
turnover - 
equities  
(mil. USD) 
New 
listings 
Number of 
equities* 
Total turnover 
- equities  
(mil. USD) 
1990    6 6 48.4 
1991 9 9 28.3 14 20 65.6 
1992 7 16 167.5 3 23 38.0 
1993 6 22 4 345.7 5 28 99.3 
1994 22 44 10 305.8 12 40 27.,6 
1995 21 65 5 638.7 5 42 347.1 
1996 18 83 11 088.2 6 45 1 606.7 
1997 62 143 15 964.4 10 49 7 689.7 
1998 57 198 17 848.6 8 55 16 139.6 
1999 28 221 22 426.0 16 66 14 469.3 
2000 13 225 38 913.6 1 60 12 109.5 
2001 9 230 19 634.7 1 56 4 836.7 
2002 5 216 15 602.8 0 49 5 869.7 
2003 6 203 20 512.3 2 53 8 233.1 
2004 36 230 32 426.3 1 47 12 774.6 
2005 35 255 59 093.0 1 45 24 210.5 
2006 38 284 107 806.0 3 43 30 897.4 
 
Note: *depends on the data provided by the stock exchange     
Source: Warsaw Stock Exchange 
 Budapest Stock Exchange 
 Exchange rates from EIU database 
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Table A2.2: The main stock market indicators from the PSE 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total value of trade  
(mil. of USD) 
309 2154 7362 14485 21436 26647 34351 31682 52246 54770 48474 45607 65717 64075 
Value of trade with 
shares and units 
244 1480 4732 9206 7770 5347 4730 6843 3386 6030 9125 18666 43459 37569 
% of shares and units in 
total value of trades 
79 68,7 64,3 63,6 36,2 20,1 13,8 21,6 6,5 11 18,8 40,9 66,1 58,6 
No. of share and  
unit issues 
971 1028 1716 1670 320 304 195 151 102 79 65 55 39 32 
Market cap. of shares 
and units (mil. USD) 
x 12267 18033 19864 15638 12893 13874 11475 8947 14601 22847 37969 55549 70456 
 
          Source: Prague Stock Exchange
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Figure A2.1: Securities delisted from the PSE (1993 – 2004) – monthly data 
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Source: Prague Stock Exchange  
Note: The number of delisted shares on the vertical axis is scaled   logarithmically. 
 
      
  Figure A2.2: Companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange by size 
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Note: Since the maximum values are extremely high outliers, maximum value is calculated 
to be the upper quartile plus 1.5 times the value of the interquartile range  
Source: Prague Stock Exchange 
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    Table A2.3: Pre-privatization descriptive statistics of size 
 
PRE-
PRIVATIZATION 
SIZE 
Difference between employees one and 
three years before privatization 
Total number of shares 
NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 1,344 262 1,244 87 1,510 269,000 755,000 102,000 
Not-delisted 146 198 526 66 154 1,556,000 5,171,000 347,000 
REASONS                
Delisted by issuer 132 440 2,657 97 143 788,000 1,628,000 241,000 
Delisted by authority 1,166 242 990 86 1,314 173,000 222,000 94,000 
Bankruptcy related 46 269 464 126 53 1,228,000 2,484,000 331,000 
TIME                
Delisted before 1997 92 260 420 103 99 124,000 176,000 64,000 
Delisted in 1997 1,088 246 1,021 84 1,225 148,000 165,000 89,000 
Delisted after 1997 164 369 2,387 106 186 1,143,000 1,892,000 609,000 
 
 
    Table A2.4: Pre-privatization descriptive statistics – financial variables 
 
PRE-
PRIVATIZATION: 
FIN. VARIABLES 
Difference between sales one and three years 
before privatization 
Profit one year before privatization 
NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 1,321 -32,000 1,706,000 -3,939 1,485 64,000 699,000 6,000 
Not-delisted 145 -259,000 1,054,000 -18,225 153 179,000 1,367,000 8,000 
REASONS              
Delisted by issuer 131 7,000 1,052,000 549 139 40,000 140,000 6,000 
Delisted by authority 1,145 -35,000 1,795,000 -4,477 1,294 66,000 746,000 6,000 
Bankruptcy related 45 -92,000 494,000 -3,932 52 80,000 222,000 15,000 
TIME              
Delisted before 1997 91 -4,000 383,000 -851 96 58,000 182,000 4,000 
Delisted in 1997 1,067 -33,000 1,853,000 -3,880 1,205 66,000 772,000 6,000 
Delisted after 1997 163 -46,000 1,015,000 -5,245 184 50,000 152,000 7,000 
 
 
Table A2.5: Descriptive statistics of privatization variables: average price according to    
privatization waves 
 
PRIVATIZATION 
CHARACTERISTICS I 
Average price 
 in the first privatization wave 
Average price  
in the second privatization wave 
NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 725 43 59 33 627 32 38 21 
Not-delisted 78 58 60 35 47 77 53 82 
REASONS               
Delisted by issuer 79 48 56 33 36 56 63 28 
Delisted by authority 619 43 61 32 580 31 35 21 
Bankruptcy related 27 30 20 24 11 25 13 21 
TIME               
Delisted before 1997 72 43 56 30 22 25 29 13 
Delisted in 1997 589 42 61 32 539 30 35 21 
Delisted after 1997 64 48 50 33 66 49 52 29 
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Table A2.6: Descriptive statistics of privatization variables: average price 
 
PRIVATIZATION 
CHARACTERISTICS II 
Average price for companies  
privatized in both waves 
Average price (the whole sample) 
NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 158 52 51 37 1,510 39 51 27 
Not-delisted 29 90 113 47 154 70 72 42 
REASONS               
Delisted by issuer 28 104 72 103 143 61 64 36 
Delisted by authority 115 41 37 30 1,314 37 50 26 
Bankruptcy related 15 43 33 36 53 32 24 27 
TIME               
Delisted before 1997 5 60 59 47 99 40 52 26 
Delisted in 1997 97 42 48 27 1,225 37 50 26 
Delisted after 1997 56 69 50 50 186 55 51 37 
   
  
Figure A2.3: Average price for delisted and non-delisted companies 
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Note: Since the maximum values are extremely high outliers, maximum value is calculated to 
be the upper quartile plus 1.5 times the value of the interquartile range  
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Table A2.7: Descriptive statistics of privatization variables: investment priv. funds 
 
INVESTMENT 
PRIVATIZATION  
FUNDS 
Investment privatization funds holdings after 
the first wave (% of total number of shares) 
Investment privatization funds holdings after 
the second wave (% of total number of shares) 
NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 881 40 21 41 784 24 22 20 
Not-delisted 107 43 22 45 76 18 19 12 
REASONS              
Delisted by issuer 106 44 22 43 64 20 21 13 
Delisted by authority 733 40 21 41 694 25 22 20 
Bankruptcy related 42 37 22 36 26 13 22 4 
TIME              
Delisted before 1997 77 36 21 37 27 23 23 16 
Delisted in 1997 686 40 21 41 635 25 22 20 
Delisted after 1997 118 42 21 40 122 18 21 10 
 
 
Table A2.8: Proportions of missing observations in subgroups of companies delisted due       
to different reasons 
Variable  
  
NOB 
% of 
total 
NOB 
Reason1:authority Reason2:issuer Reason3:bankruptcy Not delisted 
non-
missing 
% of 
total 
non-
missing 
% of 
total 
non-
missing 
% of 
total 
non-
missing 
% of 
total 
Number of shares 1664 100 1314 100 143 100 53 100 154 100 
Profit before priv. 1656 99.5 1308 99.5 142 99.3 53 100 153 99.4 
Sales before priv. 1648 99 1300 98.9 141 98.6 53 100 154 100 
Average price 1664 100 1314 100 143 100 53 100 154 100 
Operat. profit 1996 1477 88.8 1209 92 118 82.5 27 50.9 123 79.9 
Sales 1996 1465 88 1198 91.2 117 81.8 27 50.9 123 79.9 
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Table A2.9: Definitions and data sources of the variables included in the analysis 
VARIABLE NAME SOURCE DESCRIPTION 
Industry (ind_id_burza) PSE classification 
the code of industry at the PSE: it includes 19 
categories out of which 17 are relevant for us 
Employees (e3, e2, e1) 
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic 
number of employees in the company before 
privatization 
Total number of shares (tns) 
Ministry of Privatization of 
the Czech Rep. (MP CR) 
the total number of shares of a firm i.e. capital of a firm 
divided by the value of one share (1000) 
Sales (s3, s2, s1)* MP CR sales prior to privatization (three, two and one year) 
Profit (p3, p2, p1)* MP CR profit prior to privatization (three, two and one year) 
Debt (d3, d2, d1)* MP CR debt prior to privatization (three, two and one year) 
Privatization wave (cvl) MP CR 
the wave in which certain company was privatized  
(first or second); we also distinguish companies that 
wereprivatized in both waves 
National Property Fund  
ownership share (npf) 
MP CR 
proportion of company‟s shares that based on the 
privatization project were supposed to be owned by the 
National Property Fund 
Average price (ap) MP CR 
average price of the firm's shares sold in the voucher 
auctions; sold points divided by shares sold 
Number of shares in voucher 
privatization (nscp_tns) 
MP CR 
the number of shares offered in the voucher 
privatization as % of total number of shares 
IPFs' holdings after  
the first wave (ipf1_tns) 
Prague Securities Centre 
shares held by the investment privatization funds  
following the 1st privatization wave  (% of total 
number of shares) 
IPFs' holdings after 
the second  wave (ipf2_tns) 
Prague Securities Centre 
shares held by the investment privatization funds  
following the second privatization wave (% of total 
number of shares) 
Single largest owner (slo) Prague Securities Centre % of shares held by the single largest owner 
Profit  (1996 - 2003) ASPEKT database profit defined by Czech accounting standards 
Oper. profit (1996 - 2003) ASPEKT database 
operational profit defined by Czech accounting 
standards 
Sales (1996 - 2003) ASPEKT database sales defined by Czech accounting standards 
Total assets (1996 - 2003) ASPEKT database total assets defined by Czech accounting standards 
Total liabilities (1996 - 2003) ASPEKT database total liabilities defined by Czech accounting standards 
Note: The data marked with * are based on the socialistic accounting 
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Table A2.10: Results of the McNemar-type test (observed frequencies and 
2
) 
 
 
 OUR MODEL 
N
A
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E
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outcome Incorrect  Correct  
Incorrect 10 113 123 
Correct 1 1346 1347 
 11 1459 1470 
 
 
Note: Both models predict correctly 1346 delisted companies and 10 that stayed, however our 
model was in comparison to the naive estimator mistaken only once, while the naive estimator 
incorrectly predicted 113 cases. This indicates the prediction power of our model that is also 
confirmed by the test statistic 
2112
2
21122 )(
nn
nn
 that has an asymptotic 
2
 distribution. Its value 
is 110,04 which makes our results significant at all levels. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DELISTING IN THE SLOVAK AND CZECH REPUBLIC: 
GRADUAL VERSUS BIG BANG APPROACH
78
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides further insights concerning the delisting process in transition 
countries. We analyze the process of delisting share issues from the Bratislava Stock 
Exchange in Slovakia. In this analysis we utilize a special relationship between the Czech 
and Slovak economies in order to investigate the role of delisting and the way it is 
implemented for the stock market emergence. Recent development suggests that even 
though these two economies share identical roots and the first wave of mass privatization 
was conducted in the same way in both countries, the subsequent stock market 
development in the Czech and Slovak Republic did not follow the same path.  
Common background of both countries provides us with the opportunity to use the 
Czech case as a benchmark in this study. It is a natural reference point for the analysis of 
Slovakia, since both countries were part of the former Czechoslovakia until 1993. 
Nevertheless, there are several issues that make the analysis of the Slovak delisting 
different. The most important one, from the practical point of view, is the availability of 
data. The dataset we have available for Slovakia is smaller. This is not only due to the 
fact that Slovakia and its market is smaller but also because the second privatization wave 
did not materialize in the Slovak case as planned and consequently we do not have 
important explanatory variables connected to privatization for almost half of the listed 
companies. Nevertheless, our sample still contains almost 500 companies, which is 
sufficient for the analysis. Yet another difference between the two countries is the fact 
                                                          
78
 For valuable comments and suggestions I am grateful to Randall Filer, Michael Funke, Jan Hanousek, Jan 
Kmenta, Eva Liljeblom, Jan Švejnar and the participants of the Winter Research Workshop in Finance in 
Lappeenranta (November 2007). I would like to thank Róbert Vlkolinský, Head of the Listing Department 
on the Bratislava Stock Exchange for his help with acquiring the data, valuable comments and discussions. I 
am also thankful to Pavel Vodák from the Central Securities Depository of the Slovak Republic for 
providing the data and to Katarína Svitková and František Kopřiva for their help with data. While preparing 
this paper, I have benefited from GACR Grant No. 402/05/1014. 
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that the stock exchange authorities seem to adopt different strategies (not only towards 
delisting) which led to differences in the subsequent development on the Czech and 
Slovak markets. This suggests that delisting, its implementation as well as other decisions 
of the stock exchange authorities are very important for further functioning of the market. 
The aim of this paper is not only the investigation of the delisting process in the Slovak 
Republic but also utilizing the Czech and Slovak connection to outline the strategies for 
successful stock emergence in other transition economies. 
The following section provides description of the Slovak stock market 
development and the delisting process in Slovakia. Afterwards we describe the data and 
methodology applied. In section 3.5 we provide results of the estimations. Section 3.6 
deals with the connection between the Czech and Slovak market, the case of separated 
twins, and section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Privatization and the development of the Slovak stock market 
Similar to the Czech Republic, the development of the stock market in Slovakia is closely 
related to the mass privatization process. The Bratislava Stock Exchange (BSSE) was 
established at the beginning of the 1990s and, together with the Prague Stock Exchange, 
started trading on April 6, 1993. This fact is connected to the first wave of privatization 
which took place in the Czech as well as in the Slovak Republic between 1991 and 
1993
79
. The situation in Bratislava was very similar to Prague. Based on the approved 
privatization projects there were 503 companies privatized in the first wave and their 
shares were placed to the stock exchange by law. The companies from the first 
privatization wave were introduced in 1993 and at the end of this year there were 512 
share and unit issues
80
 on the BSSE. Unlike the Czech Republic, the second privatization  
                                                          
79
 Registration of individuals and investment privatization funds (IPF) started at the end of 1991 and ended 
only at the end of 1992. Afterwards the shares were distributed in May 1993 in Slovakia. For more detailed 
description see chapter 11 in Marcinčin and Beblavý (eds.), 2000. 
80
 Unit issues are securities issued by the privatization funds and the stock exchange reported them together 
with the share issues. Nevertheless, only share issues are included in our analysis. 
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wave that was planned did not materialize as originally designed in Slovakia
81
. 
Nevertheless, some new companies still entered the market and thus the number of share 
issues on the stock exchange increased. There were 850 and 970 share and unit issues 
listed on the BSSE at the end of 1995 and 1996 respectively. 
Until 1997 trading of shares was very lively and accounted for more than half of 
the total turnover on the stock exchange (see Table A3.1 in the appendix). Exceptionally 
high was this proportion in 1994, right after the first wave of mass privatization. At that 
time trading in shares accounted for 86% of the total turnover on the stock exchange. 
Similar to the situation in Prague, all this active trading was connected to the post 
privatization period when market grew very quickly. As Barto and Kmeť (2000) point 
out, the reason for this extraordinary growth was simply fight for majority ownership 
shares in the companies privatized in the first privatization wave and thus the stock 
market was a means for gaining the control over these companies. Afterwards, the authors 
continue, when the ownership structure was consolidated, the stock market became 
“redundant“. This trend is visible not only in turnover of shares, but also in the 
development of the Slovak share index (SAX), (see Figure A1.1 in the appendix 1) and 
the real market capitalization of shares and units. Stock market capitalization was the 
lowest in the OECD countries in 2000 (see Figure A3.1 in the appendix). All of these 
market measures exhibit significant worsening after 1997. Moreover, a great majority of 
trades of shares was conducted in the form of direct trades in 1997
82
 and for unrealistic 
prices (BSSE Factbook, 1997) i.e. suspicious prices that are far from the fundamental 
value. The BSSE report further specifies other factors that contributed to the worsening of 
the situation. The first one is the transformation of the investment privatization funds into 
joint-stock companies that was going on for a long time and caused absence of 
institutional investors on the market
83
. This is one of the factors hampering stock market 
development that is stressed also by the OECD in their report on Slovakia (2002). 
                                                          
81
 This is connected to changes of the government in 1994. Moravcik‟s government was planning the 
second privatization wave (it was supposed to start 15.12.1994) and about 3.3 mil. Slovak citizens 
registered to participate in it. However, in the meantime government changed and Meciar, who took the 
office, decided to cancel the second wave. 
82
 Anonymous trades accounted for less than 1% of the total value of trades with shares.  
83
 These investors, especially domestic ones, are very important for the emerging stock market as was the 
case e.g. in Poland. 
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Another one is the lack of foreign investors„ interest in the Slovak market. Nevertheless, 
we, as well as Barto and Kmeť (2000), believe that the situation was primarily caused by 
a nonstandard approach to market creation which led to having hundreds of companies on 
the stock exchange.  
 After the ownership structure of privatized companies was settled, trading with 
shares fell dramatically
84
 and this is reflected in the development of all of the above 
mentioned stock market indicators. Bačišin (2001) mentions several attempts to restore 
trading with shares in this period. The first incentive was included in the Programme 
Declarations of the Government of the Slovak Republic in 1998. Based on this document 
the citizens were supposed to get the chance to acquire shares of some important and 
strategic companies. Unfortunately, this had never materialized even though in February 
2000 BSSE together with the Association of Securities Dealers and Association of 
Investment Companies issued a joint appeal to the Slovak government to offer strategic 
companies or at least some part of their shares also to portfolio investors through capital 
market.  
Besides this attempt, there were several other projects targeted at restoring of 
trading with shares implemented on the BSSE. The first one was trading of shares in the 
new module of market makers that started in December 2000. Unlike Prague Stock 
Exchange where market makers module was introduced in 1998, it did not work in 
Bratislava, since there were not enough trades with shares, even outside the price-setting 
segment. At the beginning there were several share issues included in the market makers 
module but they were delisted in 2004 and there are no share issues traded in this module 
nowadays. The second project concerned so called New Market that was meant to attract 
quickly growing small and medium size companies willing to acquire new capital through 
the issuance of shares. Even though this market was inspired by similar markets 
functioning in the developed economies, it has not been successful in Slovakia. 
Moreover, a new structure of the market was introduced in July 2001. To make the 
market more transparent, the former market of listed securities was divided into a main  
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 Due to the finished ownership concentration, the number of securities in free float has declined 
significantly (Bačišin, 2002). 
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listed market, a parallel listed market and a new listed market. Free market was designed 
for so called unlisted securities which were still at the stock exchange, however did not 
need to fulfil requirements like the listed ones.  
Most recently, the activities of the BSSE focus to benefit issuers of securities and 
attract them to the local market
85
. Since 2006 financial market supervision is under the 
National Bank of Slovakia which eliminates complicated reporting and makes 
communication with the regulator more efficient. From March 2006 BSSE owns the 
Central Securities Depositary which makes the registration of new securities faster and, 
what is even more important from the point of view of issuers, less costly. Despite all 
these efforts of the BSSE, the situation does not seem to be improving. This may indicate 
that the stock exchange alone is not always able to solve the problems of the emerging 
stock market. Even though all the governments so far have declared their support to the 
capital market development, in reality they have not done enough; especially because the 
promised privatization of the minority shares in some strategic enterprises through the 
stock exchange has not materialized (TREND, 2006) and thus companies that could have 
been interesting for investors are not listed at the stock exchange. 
 The Slovak stock market can still be characterized by a relatively high number of 
illiquid publicly traded securities
86
. SAX, the official share index of the BSSE, consists of 
only five share issues. Turnover with shares has decreased dramatically in 2005 and 2006 
(see Table A3.1 in the appendix). Proportion of the anonymous trades is rather low and 
this situation does not contribute to generating true prices. Thus, market prices hardly 
reflect the real situation in the publicly traded company. Issuers are still not used to 
provide all information necessary to investors and they do not care about their 
shareholders, who they still consider a kind of burden left from the privatization 
(Gajdzica et al., 2002). This development makes it clear that companies and their 
willingness to be publicly traded are essential for the efficient stock market to emerge. 
New companies, however, are not willing to enter the market that in fact does not work  
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 Slovak companies that plan to issue new shares do so only abroad (e.g. SkyEurope Airlines issued its 
shares on the Warsaw and Vienna stock exchanges, IT company Asseco is listed in Warsaw as well). 
86
At the end of 2006 there were 256 shares and units on the BSSE, out of which only 10 are so called listed 
securities and the rest are unlisted (regulated free market).  
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(Hospodarske noviny, 2006). Thus, a kind of vicious circle emerges and some consider 
the integration of the Slovak market into broader Central European market to be the only 
chance for its further existence. 
 
3.2.1 Delisting process in the Slovak Republic 
Similar to the Czech case, some companies placed on the BSSE were not able to benefit 
from the possibility of being publicly traded and were, therefore, later excluded from 
public trading i.e. delisted. The delisting process, unlike that for the Prague Stock 
Exchange (PSE), started later and, based on the number of companies that remain listed 
on the BSSE
87
, it may not be over. The number of share issues that remain listed on the 
BSSE also suggests that the process of delisting on the Slovak market has followed a 
different path in comparison to the Czech case (see Figure A3.2 in the appendix). The 
main delisting wave took place five years later than on the PSE and the reasons for 
delisting in Slovakia were more uniform. The following Table 3.1 shows the number of 
delisted shares in more detail.  
The number of delisted companies in the period 1994 – 1997 was, unlike the 
Czech Republic, not high. Even though there were altogether 49 share issues with which 
trading was terminated during this period, only about one third of them was really 
delisted. The rest were securities belonging to companies that were due to e.g. 
organizational changes just issuing the shares with a new ISIN
88
 number, which were 
further traded on the stock exchange and thus these ones were not truly delisted. 
Therefore they are not considered as delisted in our empirical analysis. 
In the following four years the number of delisted companies was not significantly 
high either. Relatively more companies delisted in 1998 were those ones that were 
deleted from the Slovak Companies Register already earlier and in fact ceased to exist. 
However, in most of these cases they were delisted only in a year or later after they were 
cancelled in reality. This was caused by the fact that liquidators or other authorities 
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 At the end of December 2006 there were 256 share issues, including 46 issues of units listed on the 
BSSE. Out of them only 5 issues belong to the main listed market. On the other hand, there were 32 shares 
and units listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (out of them 10 were traded on the main market).  
88
 This happened most probably because the requirements of the security have changed. 
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responsible for the cancellation of the company did not report this to the Securities 
Register and thus it could not announce this fact to the BSSE.  
Table 3.1: Share issues delisted from the BSSE and PSE by years 
DELISTING 
BY YEARS 
All share issues delisted 
from the BSSE 
Shares from the 1st 
priv. wave delisted 
from BSSE 
All share issues 
delisted from the 
PSE 
NOB Percent NOB NOB 
1994 1 0.14 0 10 
1995 9 1.3 9 19 
1996 2 0.29 0 61 
1997 5 0.72 4 1225 
1998 19 2.74 14 11 
1999 8 1.15 3 79 
2000 14 2.02 3 28 
2001 20 2.88 2 34 
2002 339 48.85 201 14 
2003 95 13.69 49 10 
2004 68 9.8 46 10 
2005 73 10.52 34 6 
2006 41 5.91 17 9 
Total  694 100 382 1526 
Source: Bratislava Stock Exchange, Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) and author‟s calculations 
Note: The first privatization wave column includes only companies from this wave included  
in our sample, i.e. industrial companies (not the financial ones). 
 
 The major wave of delisting took place only in 2002 and the majority of securities 
was delisted due to not fulfilling their information obligation towards the BSSE. The 
process of delisting consisted of two phases. At the beginning, trading with the share 
issues of companies which had not fulfilled information obligation was suspended. If the 
necessary information was not supplied within a given period of time, the stock exchange 
decided about exemption from trading i.e. delisting. Based on the data from the BSSE the 
first suspension of trading concerned 496 share issues (of 483 issuers) and it took place 
on October 17, 2001. Then, when the required information obligation concerning the first 
half of the year 2001 was not fulfilled, the share issues were delisted on May 1, 2002. 
This decision concerned 314 share issues of 308 issuers. The groups of share issues 
delisted due to not fulfilling information obligation that followed afterwards were 
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smaller
89
. Nevertheless, the trend is clear: companies not fulfilling information obligation 
at the end of the year were delisted at the end of September of the next year and those 
ones that did not fulfil half year information obligation were then delisted at the end of 
December of a given year. The following figure shows that fulfilling information 
obligation has improved significantly after the 2002 wave of delisting. Yet another 
evidence is the fact, that most of the share issues delisted in 2004 - 2006 were delisted on 
the issuer‟s request and fulfilment of the information obligation did not play a role during 
this period.  
      Figure 3.1: Fulfilling information obligation by companies 
Source: Profit (May 16, 2005): Ročná správa o hospodárení spoločnosti (Yearly report about the 
company‟s results). 
In addition to not fulfilling the information obligation, the data provided by the 
BSSE enable us to distinguish the other two reasons for delisting. The first one is the 
decision of the authority, which can be either the BSSE or the former Securities Register 
(nowadays the Central Securities Depository) or some regulatory institution (Ministry of 
Finance, National Bank of Slovakia or the former Financial Market Authority
90
). As the 
following Table 3.2 indicates, only 6 percent of all delisted companies were delisted due 
to the decision of the authority. The other companies were delisted because they 
themselves decided to stop being traded on the exchange. Decision of the issuer means,  
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 36 share issues on October 7, 2002; 24 share issues delisted on January 14, 2003; 26 on September 26, 
2003; 4 share issues on December 29, 2004; 11 on September 28, 2004; 5 on December 28, 2004; 17 on 
September 27, 2005 and 7 on December 30, 2005. 
90
 From January 1, 2006 all its responsibilities were taken over by the National Bank of Slovakia. 
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that the general assembly of the company agreed that the company would not be publicly 
traded anymore. Not fulfilling the information obligation is in fact also the decision of the 
issuer, however, of a different nature. In this case the initiative to delist does not come 
directly from the issuer because the stock exchange initiates the whole process and the 
issuer only decides to accept or not to accept the conditions set. All in all, unlike the 
Czech Republic where most of the companies were delisted due to the decision of the 
authority, the majority of the Slovak delisted companies decided about their delisting 
themselves. This is most probably connected to the fact that the delisting wave in 
Slovakia happened five years later and during this time the companies could judge what 
kind of benefits public trading of their shares brings and if they are willing to stay 
publicly traded. At the same time, this development suggests that the Czech authorities 
were more aggressive and decided to “clean” the market even before the companies 
themselves observed the situation and decided not to be publicly listed.  
               Table 3.2: Number of delisted companies by reasons (1994 – 2006) 
REASONS  FOR 
DELISTING 
All share issues 
1st privatization 
wave 
NOB Percent NOB Percent 
Decision of the authority 42 6.33 22 5.74 
Decision of the issuer 227 34.19 112 29.24 
Information obligation 395 59.49 248 64.75 
Total  664 100 382 100 
              Note: The first privatization wave column includes only companies from this wave  
   included in our sample, i.e. industrial companies (not financial ones) 
 
3.3 Methodology 
The impact of various factors that belong to pre-privatization, privatization and post 
privatization subgroup on delisting is estimated using a similar binary regression model 
as it was in the case of the Czech Republic in chapter 2
91
. In the Slovak case, however, 
there is no need to estimate the model in two stages. With the exception of four 
companies, all the firms included in our Slovak sample report their results even before 
privatization and we do not face the problem of missing data. We estimate a binary 
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regression model where the dependent variable is the probability of delisting and the 
explanatory variables include pre-privatization and privatization factors as well as the 
financial indicators and fulfilling of the information obligation in the period after 
privatization. The logit model has the following form:  
)1.3(._._.95_
___)1(
32143
21321
iiiii
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where 
 del is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the company that was delisted before the 
end of 2006 and 0 for not-delisted 
 tns  is total number of shares of a company (in millions of shares) which in fact 
reflects the capital of a given company
92
 
 nscp_tns is the share of company privatized in the voucher privatization 
 prof_tns is profit per share one year before privatization 
 ap is average price  (in points) of a company‟s shares in the privatization auction (as 
we expect nonlinear relationship, it enters the model in quadratic as well as cubic 
form) 
 npf_dum is a dummy variable that equals one if the National Property Fund had an 
ownership share in a company (based on the information from the company‟s 
privatization project) 
 for_dum is a dummy variable that equals one if a foreign owner had an ownership 
share in a company (based on the information from the company‟s privatization 
project) 
 SLO95 is a dummy variable that equals one if the ownership share of the single 
largest owner in a given company was higher that 50% in 1995 
 op_g is growth in operational profit defined as the growth rate of average 
operational profit in the industry (between 1996 and 1997), excluding the company 
itself 
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 de_g is growth in total debt defined as the growth rate of average total debt level in 
the industry (between 1996 and 1997), excluding the company itself 
 rep is a dummy variable that serves as a proxy for fulfilling of the reporting 
obligation of the company; it equals one if company has not reported its operational 
profit in 2000 even though it was supposed to do so, 0 otherwise 
The data for the variables concerning privatization come from the time when the first 
privatization wave took place, i.e. 1993. Ownership data are from 1995, the year when 
ownership structure of the companies consolidated after the privatization. The growth in 
operational profit and the growth in total debt are defined as the growth rate between the 
current and the following year of average value in a given industry, excluding the 
company itself. This way we avoid possible endogeneity problems as there might be 
connections between some explanatory variables included in the model (e.g. post 
privatization profit may be connected to the average price per share in the privatization).  
The years under consideration are 1996 and 1997. This is the time period after 
privatization when the ownership structures of the companies from the first privatization 
wave that are subject of our investigation were already consolidated. At the same time 
this time period is also preceding the wave of delisting and financial indicators could thus 
provide guidance in identifying the companies that are going to be delisted.   
 
3.4 Data  
The dataset consists of all companies that were listed on the BSSE from the beginning of 
trading in 1993 till 2006. However, due to the fact that there was no second privatization 
wave in Slovakia, the estimations are conducted on the subsample of companies that were 
privatized in the first mass privatization wave and then placed on the stock exchange. 
This subsample consists of 496 industrial companies
93
 and contains privatization data 
from the Ministry of Privatization and the Ministry of Finance. This data comes from the 
years 1991 -1993. Financial data for the post privatization period 1996 – 1997 come from 
                                                          
93
 Based on the privatization data, there were 503 Slovak companies privatized in the first privatization 
wave. Nevertheless, when linking privatization data to the data provided by the stock exchange, it was 
possible to link 500 companies. Another 4 companies were excluded since these were financial institutions, 
not industrial firms.  
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the INFIN database
94
. The data concerning delisting were provided by the Bratislava 
Stock Exchange. Details about the legal status and further existence of the delisted 
companies are taken from the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic Companies
95
. 
When identifying the reasons for delisting all information that was available at the time 
was taken into consideration. Detailed description of the variables used in the estimation 
is provided in the appendix (Table A3.7). 
Industry dummy variables that we use to calculate growth opportunities are based 
on OKEC classification, which is used in the INFIN database as well as in the BSSE data. 
The main activities of companies, have however changed over time and since we had 
only available the most recent industry classification, we had to adjust it so that it 
corresponds to the time period we consider when calculating growth opportunities i.e. 
1996 – 1997. The industry data corresponding to the analyzed period come from the 
Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic Companies Register.  
We also use data concerning a single largest owner of the company after the 
privatization. It includes his ownership share and identification of the owner‟s type. We 
distinguish between domestic and foreign owners as well as the fact if the owner is a 
bank, company, individual entrepreneur, state, privatization fund or other subject. This 
data come from the Central Securities Depository of the Slovak Republic.  
 
3.4.1 Data description 
Descriptive statistics that we use for the subgroup of delisted and not-delisted as well as 
for the subgroups concerning different reasons and time of delisting exhibit quite a high 
degree of variability. This is most probably connected to the heterogeneity of the 
companies that were privatized in the first privatization wave.  
 Pre-privatization variables that are included in our analysis can be divided into 
two groups. The first one concerns the size of a privatized company. It includes the 
number of employees and total number of shares which in fact reflects the capital of a  
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 This database is provided by the company INFIN Ltd. (Information in Finance). More information 
available at http://www.infinet.sk. 
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given company. The second group contains financial indicators for the period before the 
privatization took place. The size of the company measured by the number of employees 
is decreasing for all the companies with approaching privatization, which can be the sign 
of the on-going restructuring process. There are however no significant
96
 differences in 
the number of employees between delisted and not-delisted companies or depending on 
the reason for delisting (see Table A3.2 in the appendix). On the other hand, there are 
significant differences in size measured by the number of employees as well as the total 
number of shares when we take time of delisting into account. Here we distinguish among 
companies delisted before the major wave in 2002, companies delisted in 2002 and 
companies delisted afterwards. Our results show that the smallest companies were 
delisted already before the main wave. This points out to the fact that the size of the 
company, similar to the Czech case, matters for delisting. Moreover, there are significant 
differences between delisted and not-delisted companies when the indicator of total 
number of shares is used.  From the financial indicators included in the second group of 
pre-privatization indicators only the profit one year before the privatization exhibits 
significantly differences in values for different subgroups of companies (see Table A3.3 
in the appendix). Based on our nonparametric test it is significantly different for delisted 
and not-delisted companies and also for the companies delisted due to different reasons. 
As one would expect, it is higher for not-delisted companies, thus indicating that they 
might be strong enough to survive on the stock exchange. 
 Further we examine several variables connected to the privatization process (see 
Tables A3.4 and A3.5 in the appendix). The majority of these indicators exhibit 
significantly different values for various subsamples of companies. The most important 
from our point of view are the differences in average price which is significantly different 
for all subgroups that we consider. Companies that were not delisted have higher average 
price in comparison to the delisted ones. This indicates that bidders in the privatization 
process were able to judge the future prospects of the companies based on the then 
available information. The lowest average price concerns the companies that were 
delisted due to not fulfilling the information obligation. This result is confirmed also 
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when accounting for the time of delisting – the lowest average price concerns companies 
delisted in 2002 during a big wave of delisting which arose especially due to not fulfilling 
the information obligation. Thus these might be the weakest companies that had to be 
pushed out of the stock exchange by the authorities. 
 The ownership structure presented in the privatization plan is different for delisted 
and not-delisted companies. In delisted ones, the National Property Fund (NPF) tends to 
hold lower proportion of shares and foreign investors tend to be stronger in not-delisted 
companies, which is in line with our expectations. Moreover, there are significant 
differences when considering the NPF ownership and the time of delisting. Companies 
with higher NPF ownership share tend to be delisted later because NPF is a shareholder 
with a rather strong position. Another evidence of a strong ownership position of NPF as 
well as foreign owners is the fact that when accounting for delisting reasons delisting by 
issuer is the most common for companies with high NPF or foreign share. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics of the post-privatization variables included in our 
model are summarized in Table A3.6 in the appendix. The indicators of growth in 
operational profit and growth in total debt as they were defined above are investigated. As 
expected growth of operational profit that in fact represents the potential profit figure is 
significantly lower for delisted companies and for the ones delisted in 2002 or earlier. On 
the other hand, except for delisted and not-delisted companies there are no significant 
differences in the growth rate of total debt, which might indicate that all the companies 
were indebted to certain extent after the privatization since they needed resources for 
restructuring.  
This brief inspection of the pre-privatization, privatization and post-privatization 
variables suggests that there are certain differences between delisted and not-delisted 
companies and we are going to examine these in more detail further.  
 
3.5 Estimation results 
The above described logit model is run on the sample of all companies listed on the 
BSSE after the first wave of voucher privatization. The results of our estimation are 
summarized in the following Table 3.3.  
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   Table 3.3: Logit model for delisting (y=1 for delisting) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION Results Interpretation 
Pre-privatization factors 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
dP/dX 
Effect of one 
st.deviation change 
Total number of shares (millions of shares) -0.242  0.247 -0.036 -0.034 
Profit before privatization (scaled by book value) -0.189  0.544 -0.028 -0.007 
Privatization factors       
  
Proportion of shares in mass privatization -0.007   0.013 -0.001 -0.018 
Average price in voucher auction (in points) -0.029 * 0.016 -0.004   
Average price (quadratic) 0.0004 ** 0.0002 0.0001   
Average price (cubic) -1.3E-06 *** 5.2E-07 -1.9E-07   
Average price (overall effect)       -0.003 -0.130 
National property fund ownership -1.074 ** 0.496 -0.160   
Foreign owner ownership share -2.040 ** 1.016 -0.303   
Single largest owner dummy (1995) 0.774 * 0.454 0.115   
Post-privatization factors       
  
Operational profit growth -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.002 -0.045 
Total debt growth 0.005 * 0.003 0.001 0.042 
Reporting dummy 2.476 *** 0.471 0.368   
Constant 1.519   1.354 0.226   
Number of observations 489 
Scaled R2  0.167 
Note: The table contains estimation results for the logit model. We report estimated coefficients, 
their significance (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%) as well as 
marginal effects (dP(y=1)/dX). 
The explanatory variables describing the pre-privatization period do not show up 
significant in the estimation. Profit before privatization was not significant in the Czech 
case either and this fact is most probably connected to the quality of this data that is based 
on the socialist accounting. In this sense, profit does not necessarily reflect real profit and 
the situation in a company but only production. Apart from the profit indicator, unlike the 
Czech Republic, even the company size does not play a role as determinant of delisting in 
Slovakia. Such a result is surprising and rather nonstandard, especially when taking the 
situation in the Czech Republic as benchmark. It may indicate that there were not enough 
companies delisted from the Slovak market or the size of delisted companies follows a 
random distribution. Indeed, unlike Czech Republic, there were also relatively big 
companies delisted from the stock exchange since after receiving majority ownership 
share some owners decided not to be listed anymore. 
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Almost all coefficients of the explanatory variables connected to the privatization 
process are significant. The only exception is the proportion of the company privatized in 
the voucher privatization. Descriptive statistics confirm that it was relatively high for the 
majority of the observations and this low variability might have contributed to the non-
significance of the estimated coefficient. Nevertheless, the most important factor is the 
average price in voucher auctions which in our setting could be considered a proxy for 
share price. The results correspond to our expectations as higher price in voucher auctions 
indicates a higher valuation of the company and thus better future prospects and lower 
probability of delisting. We expect nonlinear relationship between average price and 
delisting and therefore average price enters the model also in quadratic and cubic form. 
Their combined effect on delisting is significant and negative. A one standard deviation 
increase in the average price decreases the probability of delisting by 13 percent.  
The ownership share of the National Property Fund (NPF) and the foreign owners, 
as reported in the privatization projects, is an important determinant as well. The results 
show that the probability of delisting decreases by 16 percent in the presence of the NPF. 
Furthermore, the foreign owner contributes to decreasing this probability even more, by 
30.3 percent. These results point out that these groups of owners had significant impact 
on privatized companies and the ownership structure is one of the key factors that 
determine delisting. The role of the single largest owner with majority ownership share is 
also important. Probability of delisting increases by 11.5 percent for the companies where 
single largest owner owned more than 50% of the company's shares at the end of 1995, 
i.e. in the time when the ownership structure after the first privatization wave was more 
less settled. The same holds true when the percentage of company owned by a single 
largest owner is considered instead of the dummy variable for more than 50% ownership 
share. The higher the ownership share of a single largest owner, the higher is the 
probability of being delisted
97
. We have also accounted for the type of the single largest 
owner in our estimations, nevertheless it was not significant. 
The main delisting wave took place in 2002 and therefore post-privatization firm  
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characteristics are also included in our model. All of the estimated coefficients in this 
group are significant. The most important from them is the dummy variable describing 
fulfilling of the reporting obligations. It is constructed based on the availability of data for 
a given company in 2000, long enough before the main delisting wave took place in 2002. 
According to these results, the probability of delisting increases by 36.8 percent if a 
company does not fulfil its reporting obligation in 2000. This result is also in line with the 
fact that most of the companies delisted in 2002 left the market due to not fulfilling 
information criteria required by the BSSE.  
The other two post-privatization variables assess financial situation of a company; 
we use the indicator of operational profit and total debt. In order to prevent problems with 
possible endogeneity in estimation, we construct growth in operational profit and growth 
in total debt variables as the growth rate between the current and the following year of 
average value in a given industry, excluding the company itself. Even though the 
estimated coefficients in our model are significant with expected signs, their influence is 
lower than in the case of the reporting dummy variable which might also be a 
consequence of the way they were constructed. The probability of delisting decreases 
with increasing growth potential in operational profit so that one standard deviation 
increase in operational profit growth constitutes a 4.5 percent decrease in the probability 
of delisting. On the other hand, one standard deviation increase in the growth of total debt 
brings about 4.2 percent increase in the probability of delisting. These results are in line 
with our expectations and show that future prospects reflected in our growth variables are 
important determinants of delisting.  
Table 3.3 further shows that the measure for goodness of fit - R
2
 is not very high. 
It is however sufficient when taking into consideration the nature of the estimated model 
and a relatively high proportion of delisted companies in our dataset. Similar to the Czech 
case, we apply a McNemar-type of test suggested by Hanousek (2000) to compare our 
model to a naive estimator on the basis of their predictive accuracy. The results 
summarized in Table A3.8 in the appendix confirm that our estimator dominates the 
naive estimator in terms of prediction accuracy. This way the significance of our results is 
confirmed. They show that there are several economic variables which could have been 
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used when placing privatized companies on the stock exchange after the first privatization 
wave and thus prevent massive delisting.  
 
3.6 Czech and Slovak connection: tale of separated twins 
Czech Republic is a natural reference point for the analysis of Slovakia, since both 
countries were part of the former Czechoslovakia and share common historical and 
cultural background. Moreover, mass privatization which prompted stock market 
emergence was originated using the same concept in both countries. The first 
privatization wave was conducted in the same way. On the other hand, the second one did 
not materialize as originally designed in Slovakia. Despite this fact a lot of new share 
issues entered the Slovak stock market in 1995 and 1996 and thus the situation on the 
market was basically the same as in the Czech Republic; at both the Prague Stock 
Exchange (PSE) as well as the BSSE the maximum number of listed share issues was 
achieved in 1996.  
Afterwards however, the development on both markets started to differ. While 
1225 share issues were delisted in four waves during 1997 in the Czech Republic, in 
Slovakia no significant delisting took place until 2002 when 339 share issues were 
delisted from the BSSE. Then, between 2003 and 2006, another 280 issues were delisted. 
Nevertheless, as it was already mentioned, there is still a relatively large number of share 
issues listed on the BSSE even nowadays. This development suggests two different 
approaches to delisting.  
Czech institutions implemented a kind of a “big bang” strategy i.e. a lot of issues 
that did not fulfil specified criteria were delisted within a short period of time. This way 
market was cleaned relatively quickly, became more transparent and this contributed to 
its attractiveness for investors. Development on the stock exchange measured by the PSE 
index confirms its gradual growth after this cleaning. On the other hand, even though 
some delisting took place in Slovakia, the stock exchange authorities are still trying to 
keep companies listed (on the so called free market), work with companies individually, 
explain the advantages of being listed to them and they seemed to hope that the 
companies would then, later on move to the listed market. It is however rather difficult to 
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proceed with this kind of strategy when market is not working, it does not fulfil its main 
functions and consequently provides no motivation for companies to stay listed. In fact, 
Slovak companies have never experienced a really functioning stock market which only 
adds uncertainty. Taking into account the size of the Slovak market, it is also possible to 
speculate that the gradual strategy of BSSE is preferred to the “big bang” one because 
otherwise the existence of the whole market could be seriously threatened
98
.  
Description of the development on both markets suggests that there are significant 
differences between the Czech and Slovak market which we also confirm in the following 
estimations. Similar logit model as described above in the equation (3.1) is run on the 
sample including all the Czech and Slovak companies privatized in the first privatization 
wave. The explanatory variables are in the similar way as before divided into the pre-
privatization, privatization and post-privatization ones. In this case, however, a country 
dummy variable based on the company‟s location is added into the model. It indicates if a 
company is Czech or Slovak. Dependent variable is again dummy variable for delisting. 
Results of the estimation are displayed in the following Table 3.4.  
Similar to our previous estimations, all the estimated coefficients with the 
exception of the pre-privatization profit are significant and have expected signs. The most 
influential is the country dummy variable indicating that the probability of delisting of a 
Slovak company is 17 percent lower than for a Czech one. This result is highly significant 
and it is in line with the strategy implemented by the BSSE that is trying to keep the 
companies listed on the stock exchange as long as possible and gradually work on 
improving their situation.  
We have also tried to add interaction terms into main model, however, the 
corresponding estimated coefficients were not significant. This indicates that the selected 
determinants of delisting matter in the same way at both markets. 
The aforementioned description of the Czech and Slovak emerging stock markets 
and their unique common background suggest that this case of “separated twins” can be 
used not only to uncover the reasons for massive delisting and its effect on the market  
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functioning but also to identify strategies critical for a successful stock market 
development in other emerging economies. A close connection between these two 
markets and a very similar unfavorable development on both markets in the first half of 
the 1990s, despite different institutional changes, emphasizes the importance of mass 
privatization implemented in these countries. Moreover, different delisting strategies and 
subsequent development on these markets suggest that the decisions of the stock 
exchange authorities are crucial for further functioning of the market.  
     Table 3.4: Logit model for the Czech and Slovak Republics (y=1 for delisting) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION Results Interpretation 
Pre-privatization factors 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
dP/dX  one SD 
effect 
Total number of shares (millions of shares) -0.194 ** 0.082 -0.023 -0.036 
Profit before privatization (scaled by book value) -0.010  0.015 -0.001 -0.005 
Privatization factors 
  
   
Average price in voucher auction (in points) -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.0004 -0.021 
National property fund ownership dummy -0.357 ** 0.182 -0.043  
Foreign owner ownership dummy -0.937 *** 0.362 -0.112  
Post-privatization factors 
  
   
Operational profit growth -0.008 ** 0.004 -0.001 -0.024 
Total debt growth 0.005 * 0.003 0.001 0.018 
Slovak dummy variable -1.425 *** 0.226 -0.170  
Constant 2.464 *** 0.145 0.294  
Number of observations 1 476 
Scaled R2  0.055 
Note: The table contains estimation results for the logit model. We report estimated   
coefficients, their significance (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant  
at 1%) as well as marginal effects (dP(y=1)/dX). 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Similar to the Czech Republic, the Slovak stock market has experienced a rather big wave 
of delisting. This happened despite the fact that the second privatization wave did not 
materialize in Slovakia. The majority of companies was delisted only in the year 2002, 
five years later than in the Czech Republic. Our examination uncovers, that variables 
connected to privatization play an important role in this process and based on them it was 
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possible to identify companies that were going to be delisted even before the actual 
delisting took place.  
Using the Czech and Slovak connection we point out that despite the same initial 
conditions, their stock markets have developed in a different way after the companies 
privatized under the mass privatization scheme entered them. This seems to be the result 
of significantly different strategies adopted by the PSE and the BSSE. This result points 
out a crucial role that authorities play in the development of the emerging stock markets.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3.1: The main stock market indicators from the BSSE 
  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of share and  
unit issues 
512 523 850 970 918 833 830 866 888 510 452 389 306 256 
   of that listed 11 19 21 21 14 14 11 10 12 15 14 14 13 10 
   of that unlisted 501 504 829 949 904 819 819 856 876 495 438 375 293 246 
Total turnover  
(bil of SKK) 
0.2 6.3 40.1 114.1 164.1 299.1 188.4 255.5 393.5 643.2 1096.7 432.3 1001.9 992.1 
Turnover of shares and units 
(bil. of SKK) 
0.1 5.4 24.7 83.1 82.7 37.3 20.2 25.1 45.8 34.9 24.4 21.4 2.1 2.6 
% of share and unit in total 
turnover 
53.7 86.4 61.7 72.8 50.4 12.5 10.7 9.8 11.6 5.4 2.2 4.9 0.21 0.26 
% of negotiated deals in 
turnover of shares and units 
79.5 85.6 98.4 91.1 97.2 94.8 91.3 92.6 94.8 97.0 93.4 60.2 79.8 52.4 
Market cap. of shares and 
units (bil.of SKK) 
93.8 97.4 158.3 184.1 184.1 152.0 150.8 154.9 167.6 105.0 110.9 140.1 151.7 153 
Real market capitalization of 
shares (% of GDP) 
  12.3 12.8 11.5 6.7 6.0 6.6 7.8 6.9 7.5 9.5 9.6 9.2 
Total market capitalization 
(% of GDP) 
  30.6 32.0 28.1 21.2 18.5 17.5 16.9 9.6 9.2 10.6 10.3 9.6 
Source: Bratislava Stock Exchange 
Note: Real market capitalization is market capitalization (MC) of issues which have market price. it does not include nominal value of issues which were traded 
just in negotiated deals. includes units and shares of investment funds. 
Total market capitalization includes nominal MC. real MC and MC of units and shares of investment funds
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         Figure A3.1: Stock market capitalization in OECD countries (% of GDP in 2000) 
 
Source: OECD (Economic Survey of the Slovak Republic 2002) 
 
 
       Figure A3.2: Share issues listed on the Bratislava and Prague Stock Exchange  
               (1993 – 6/2007) 
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Table A3.2: Pre-privatization descriptive statistics of size 
PRE-
PRIVATIZATION: 
SIZE 
Difference between emloyees one and three 
years before privatization 
Total number of shares 
Subgroup/Indicator NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 307 193 348 75 382 210769 913409 57020 
Not-delisted 100 214 390 94 114 292668 1097164 71006 
REASONS         
Delisted by authority 14 176 326 78 22 83773 178171 24902 
Delisted by issuer 86 180 292 66 112 331444 1604496 51168 
Information obligation 207 199 371 82 248 167536 342647 61626 
TIME         
Delisted before 2002 22 231 288 120 35 122835 216297 34666 
Delisted in 2002 171 213 396 82 201 184668 379817 65094 
Delisted after 2002 114 154 272 55 146 267782 1405775 52703 
 
Table A3.3: Pre-privatization descriptive characteristics – financial variables 
PRE-PRIVATIZATION: 
FINANCIAL 
VARIABLES 
Difference between sales three and  
one year before privatization 
Profit one year before privatization  
(% of total number of shares) 
Subgroup/Indicator NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 301 -110673 1573684 4644 379 0.086 0.264 0.044 
Not-delisted 89 8347 201416 1266 113 0.113 0.174 0.069 
REASONS         
Delisted by authority 13 -12270 168814 6636 22 0.215 0.616 0.036 
Delisted by issuer 86 -339363 2924906 8841 112 0.096 0.177 0.060 
Information obligation 202 -19642 213047 3446 245 0.070 0.244 0.032 
TIME         
Delisted before 2002 21 13681 156382 21413 35 0.14 0.49 0.04 
Delisted in 2002 167 -21677 229218 4287 198 0.08 0.26 0.03 
Delisted after 2002 113 -265307 2551932 3426 146 0 0 0.05 
 
   Table A3.4: Descriptive characteristics of privatization variables I 
PRIVATIZATION 
CHARACTERISTICS I 
Number of shares in voucher priv. 
 (% of total number of shares) 
Average price in the first privatization 
wave 
Subgroup/Indicator NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 382 90 17 97 382 31 33 23 
Not-delisted 114 86 20 97 114 37 54 30 
REASONS         
Delisted by authority 22 92 15 97 22 45 36 42 
Delisted by issuer 112 90 17 97 112 37 36 32 
Information obligation 248 90 17 97 248 27 31 21 
TIME         
Delisted before 2002 35 95 14 97 35 34 30 31 
Delisted in 2002 201 90 17 97 201 28 33 21 
Delisted after 2002 146 90 17 97 146 34 34 30 
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  Table A3.5: Descriptive characteristics of privatization variables II 
PRIVATIZATION 
CHARACTERISTICS II 
Proportion of shares held by the National 
Property Fund 
Proportion of shares held by  
foreign investors 
Subgroup/Indicator NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 382 3.60 11.57 0 382 0.58 5.87 0 
Not-delisted 114 7.24 16.02 0 114 1.51 8.19 0 
REASONS         
Delisted by authority 22 1.32 6.18 0 22 0 0 0 
Delisted by issuer 112 4.41 13.66 0 112 0.99 8.08 0 
Information obligation 248 3.44 10.89 0 248 0.44 4.87 0 
TIME         
Delisted before 2002 35 0 0 0 35 2.29 13.52 0 
Delisted in 2002 201 3.25 10.80 0 201 0.55 5.40 0 
Delisted after 2002 146 4.95 13.62 0 146 0.21 2.57 0 
 
    Table A3.6: Descriptive characteristics of post-privatization variables 
POST-
PRIVATIZATION 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Growth rate – potential profit  
(based on operational profit  
between 1996 and 1997)* 
Growth rate – debt  
 (based total debt 
 between 1996 and 1997)* 
Subgroup/Indicator NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median NOB Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Delisted 382 -27.0 28.5 -31.1 382 48 51 56.9 
Not-delisted 114 -22 32.9 -26 114 40.1 55.8 23.1 
REASONS         
Delisted by authority 22 -31.3 9.7 -36 22 48.3 19.6 56.9 
Delisted by issuer 112 -25.0 32.0 -27.9 112 45.7 59.6 28 
Information obligation 248 -27.6 28.0 -33.8 248 49.2 49.3 56.9 
TIME         
Delisted before 2002 35 -28.5 23.8 -36.4 35 47.8 17 56.9 
Delisted in 2002 201 -30.1 25 -36.4 201 47.2 42.7 56.9 
Delisted after 2002 146 -22.4 33.6 -26.7 146 49.4 65.9 34.2 
    *Note: Both growth indicators are calculated as the growth rate between the current and the  
      following year of average value in a given industry, excluding the company itself. 
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Table A3.7: Definitions and data sources of the variables included in the analysis 
VARIABLE NAME  SOURCE DESCRIPTION 
Employees  
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic  
number of employees in the company before 
privatization 
Total number of shares 
(tns) 
Ministry of Privatization of 
the Czech Republic (MP CR) 
the total number of shares of a firm 
i.e. capital of a firm divided by the value of one 
share (1000) 
Profit (p3, p2, p1) MP CR 
profit prior to privatization (three, two and one 
year) 
Average price (AP) 
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic  
average price of the firm's shares sold in the 
auctions; sold points divided by shares sold 
Number of shares in 
mass priv. (NSCP_TNS) 
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic 
the number of shares offered in the coupon 
privatization as % of total number of shares 
Shares held by the 
National Property Fund 
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic 
% of shares that should based on the privatization 
project be kept by the NPF 
Shares held by foreign  
investors (for) 
Ministry of Privatization 
of the Czech Republic 
% of shares that should based on the privatization 
project be sold to a foreign investor 
Single largest owner 
(slo) 
Central Securities Depository 
of the Slovak Republic 
% of shares owned by the single largest owner at 
the end of 1995 
Operational profit  
(1995 - 2000) 
INFIN database,  
supplemented by AMADEUS 
operational profit defined by the Slovak 
accounting standards, row 29 in the profit and 
loss account 
Total debt 
(1995 - 2000) 
INFIN databaase 
total debt defined by the Slovak accounting 
standards, row 86 of the in the balance sheet 
 
Note: Ministry of Privatization of the Czech Republic was the successor of the Ministry for Privatization of 
the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 
 
 
Table A3.8: Results of the McNemar-type test (observed frequencies and 
2
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outcome Incorrect  Correct  
Incorrect 15 98 113 
Correct 10 369 379 
 25 467 492 
 
 
Note: Both models predict correctly 369 delisted companies and 15 that stayed, however our model was in 
comparison to the naive estimator mistaken only ten times, while the naive estimator incorrectly predicted 
98 cases. This indicates the prediction power of our model that is also confirmed by the test statistic 
2112
2
21122 )(
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 that has an asymptotic 
2
 distribution. Its value is 71.704 which makes our results 
significant at all levels. 
